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WHEN DOES COPYRIGHT LAW REQUIRE
TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS?
AIKEN MEETS AEREO
Yvette Joy Liebesman †

ABSTRACT
Within the Copyright Act, innovation and technological advances are the bases for the
enactment or amendment of many sections. Technology is often fundamental to the
language of the section, and the underlying technology matters even when it is paired with a
technology-neutral section. And because technology matters, how it functions could be
essential in resolving a copyright infringement dispute.
One such provision, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), allows small businesses to “publicly perform”
copyrighted music via a radio, as long as certain conditions regarding the equipment used
are met. Only small businesses are eligible, and the proprietors can only use systems that are
commonly found in homes. In addition, the performance cannot be retransmitted to
another location, and only a single receiving apparatus can be used. Known as the “Aiken” or
“Homestyle” Exemption, when Congress codified the § 110(5) of the Copyright Act of
1976, these seemed like reasonable limitations. At the time, lawmakers did not contemplate
or even envision the existence or commercialization of wireless speaker technology. Now,
however, one can connect a cellphone, iPod, MP3 player, or other portable electronic
device via Bluetooth, standard radio, or even the Internet, to a wireless speaker. When
determining whether a system falls within the Homestyle Exemption, both Congress and
the courts have stressed the importance of examining the underlying technology.
Technology matters in the Copyright Act.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. has
thrown the principle of “technology matters” into flux. The majority affirmatively construed
the Transmit Clause as it related to several technology-specific sections of the Act in a
technology-blind manner; indeed, it held that the underlying technological architecture of
an allegedly infringing system was irrelevant. This decision may have wide-reaching effects,
and cannot be viewed in a vacuum. When examined in relation to other sections of the
Copyright Act of 1976, it behooves us to question whether this is what Congress intended.
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INTRODUCTION

In many sections of the Copyright Act, the technology used by the
relevant actors is germane both at its enactment and in later applications
of the law. An examination of § 110(5)—the Homestyle Exemption—
exemplifies this. Imagine we are walking past various shops in a mall. First
we enter a clothing store, and through speakers on the wall we hear a local
rock radio station. The second store—selling boots and hats—is playing
music from a country-western station. The stereo system in both of these
stores is comprised of speakers attached to a radio receiver via “speaker
wire.” Next, we enter a pet store, where soft, classical music is heard above
the sweet yelping of puppies (all wanting us to take them home). The
music is broadcast through a “boom box” (which contains a radio receiver
and two speakers in a single device) behind the cashier’s counter.
The proprietor of the fourth shop we visit also is playing radio music
via a stereo system, similar to the other three. However, the owner of this
establishment, when choosing among the variety of options at the local
electronics store, fell in love with the new Polk® Audio home stereo
wireless system, which consists of a radio with a built-in Bluetooth
transmitter and two wireless speakers. The sound is amazing, and the
installation costs were significantly less than drilling holes and running
speaker wire. The fifth shop we pass is also using a wireless speaker
system. This one consists of a standard Radio Frequency (RF)
transmitter—the type common in transistor radios—attached to the stereo
receiver base located in the storeroom. The RF transmitter broadcasts on a
common frequency to two wireless speakers located on the sales floor.
We usually do not think much about the source of the music that we
hear in these stores or the copyright implications of playing music for the
enjoyment of customers and employees. If we did, we would know that, as
discussed in detail infra, 1 even without obtaining a public performance
license, 2 none of the first three stores are infringing on the composers’
copyrights. Each of these enterprises is allowed to play this radiobroadcasted music based on a 1975 Supreme Court case and its
subsequent codification in § 110(5) 3 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 4 This
1. See infra Part II.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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exemption was originally known as the Aiken Exemption, 5 but is now
commonly called the Homestyle Exemption. 6 Things get murkier with the
fourth and fifth stores: even though the technologies used in the latter two
stores may commonly be found in a home, store owners using this new
technology may fail to qualify for the Homestyle Exemption. The use of
wireless technology may not give these latter two storeowners a defense to
infringement of the public performance right, and the copyright owners of
the musical compositions that are broadcast may have a cause of action
against the latter two storeowners. 7 This depends on whether courts will
be construing the Copyright Act’s Homestyle Exemption in a “technology
blind” manner. On the one hand, if the functional aspects of the devices
used by an alleged infringer do matter, then the underlying technology
involved in an infringement claim will be considered in a court’s analysis.
Conversely, the Copyright statute could be interpreted in a “technology
blind” manner, whereby courts ignore how a particular system actually
operates, and instead interpret the statutory language without
consideration to how the underlying technology functions.
Determining if those two latter stereo systems also fall within the
Homestyle Exemption illuminates the quandary created by the Supreme
Court in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.: 8 whether how the
different wireless technologies operate should be taken into consideration.
When the Homestyle Exemption to infringement of a copyright owner’s
public performance right was first pronounced and later codified, the
justices and legislators based the Exemption on the technology present at
the time, which did not account for the future popularity of wireless
receivers—or even their existence at the consumer electronic level.
This Article argues that invoking “technology blindness” to resolve
copyright issues—even when limited to those issues falling under the
Transmit Clause—could result in a net harm. First, the Transmit Clause
5. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
6. See, e.g., On the Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 789
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1
(1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (noting that the proposed
bill would expand “the existing ‘homestyle’ exemption in section 110(5)”). This Article
will use these terms interchangeably.
7. While direct copyright infringement liability—as well as secondary liability—
may extend to the owner of the shopping mall, this is a tangential to the topic of this
Article, and will not be discussed herein.
8. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
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is rarely construed in a vacuum; the Homestyle Exemption is just one
example where it is read in conjunction with another section of the
Copyright Act. Second, when enacting these sections, Congress was clear
that courts should examine the technology in use. While invoking
technology blindness would help in the occasional situation where new
technology might “look like” a form that falls within one of the Copyright
Act’s exemptions, it will more likely inhibit innovation when the new
technology superficially “looks like” one which requires a license. By
ignoring situations where the underlying “behind the scenes” technology
would otherwise fall within the Act, innovators would be paralyzed,
unable to rely on work-arounds with no guarantee that courts would find
their inventions to be noninfringing. One can almost always find—among
many options—that to some non-technology savvy end users, an
innovation “looks like” it is an infringing device. In other words,
technology matters.
As such, Part II of this Article provides the foundation and history
behind the Homestyle Exemption to the public performance right, first
through its pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 9 and its later adoption, though based on a
different rationale, by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976. 10 This Part
also provides the “nuts and bolts” of how wired and wireless speaker
systems operate and sets forth the test used in evaluating stereo systems
under the Homestyle Exemption—a very technology-specific assessment.
Part III applies the exemption to the three currently popular forms of
wireless speaker technology, focusing on the multiple receivers and
transmitters required for any wireless system. This Part also touches on the
use of Internet radio as a source for performed content—yet another
technological advancement not considered when the Homestyle
Exemption was enacted. However, these earlier Parts are merely a prelude,
providing background to a broader, more pertinent question: how far does
the Supreme Court’s construction of “technology blindness” in Aereo go?
Thus, the first three Parts form a bridge to Part IV, which addresses the
concept of “technology blindness” and the recent Supreme Court decision,

9. See Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 162–64. The District Court decision, Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1973), will be referred to as
Aiken I, and the Third Circuit’s holding, Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500
F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), will be referred to as Aiken II.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5700–01
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; infra Part II.B.2.
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 11 The Court’s reliance on the
fallacy that Aereo’s system of antennas “resemble” a cable company’s
transmission of a signal (and thus infringe on broadcasters’ copyright
rights) is used to interpret the wireless speaker system as “resembling” a
wired system, without examining the differences in the technologies. Part
IV examines how this “technology blind” approach would affect
application of the Homestyle Exemption. This Article then contends that
“technology blindness” is the wrong approach, and discusses its
detrimental consequences. Part V asserts the importance of analyzing the
Copyright Act in relation to the underlying technology at issue. This
Article concludes that interpreting statutes without considering the behind
the scenes technological architecture of a potentially infringing product
can inhibit innovation and adversely disrupt courts, innovators, and
anyone who abhors vagueness and uncertainty in the rule of law.
II.

THE AIKEN/HOMESTYLE EXEMPTION: ITS ORIGINS,
CODIFICATION, AND RELATION TO THE TRANSMIT
CLAUSE

Historically, as technological innovations provided a greater audience
for works, copyright rights have been asserted more broadly as well.
Gramophones, and later on radios, allowed those with no musical skills to
hear great works performed by accomplished musicians in the privacy of
their own homes. Yet copyright owners were unable to stop others from
financially benefiting from this new access to their works—the technology
at issue had not been conferred copyright rights under then-applicable
copyright law. This is because in earlier versions of the Copyright Act, the
types of works covered were specifically delineated, with the list amended
from time to time in order to bring new technology within its purview. 12
For example, in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 13 the
Supreme Court held that player piano rolls could not be “read” by a
human, and thus those who produced “unauthorized” copies were not
infringing on the music encoded in the rolls. Congress later remedied this

11. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
12. For example, under the 1831 Act, only books, maps, charts, musical
compositions, prints, cuts, and engravings were covered. An Act to Amend the Several
Acts Respecting Copyrights, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
13. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
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in the 1909 Copyright Act by incorporating expanded language to cover
mechanical performances. 14
The Aiken (or Homestyle) Exemption is another example in the long
history of technological advances at the heart of the enactment of a section
in the Copyright Act. This exemption provides small businesses with a
safe harbor by allowing them to broadcast music or a television program
without infringing on the copyright owner’s public performance rights.
While the Supreme Court’s rationale in Aiken III 15 was rejected by
Congress when the Copyright Act was revised, the exemption was
nonetheless retained and codified in the 1976 Act, albeit on a different
basis. Underlying this exemption was the increased availability of home
listening devices and other technologies that brought music and dramatic
entertainment out of theatres and public gatherings and into more diverse
settings, such as stores, restaurants, and homes.
This Part begins with an overview of the public performance right
prior to 1976, then details the Homestyle Exemption delineated in the
three Aiken decisions—how it was developed and the intent behind
providing this limitation to a copyright owner’s public performance right.
This Part then discusses its incorporation as the “Homestyle Exemption”
into the Copyright Act of 1976, its relation to the “Transmit Clause”
included in the definition of “public performance,” and the impact of
statutory interpretations of rights versus exemptions.
A.

THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT BEFORE THE 1976 ACT

The public performance right was not among those originally granted
in the first Copyright Act. The 1790 Act, as well as those preceding the
1856 Amendments, only provided rights “to print, reprint, publish and
vend,” and only for maps, charts, books, and books already printed. 16
Congress first included public performance rights in copyrighted works in
the 1856 Amendments—sixty-six years later—but only for dramatic
works. 17 These rights were expanded to include musical compositions in
the Copyright Act of 1897. 18

14. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075.
15. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 160 (1975)
(holding that Aiken did not “perform” the copyrighted works within the meaning of the
Act).
16. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. In 1865, photographs were added to the list.
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 540.
17. The Act read:
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At the time of the Aiken litigation, the 1909 Act was in force, with § 1
providing a public performance right for musical compositions. 19 To
enforce these rights, artists typically joined one of the musicians’ rights
organizations such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP), 20 Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), 21 Harry Fox Music
Publishing, 22 or Twentieth Century Music Corporation. These
organizations in turn licensed the public performance right on behalf of
artists, collected the license fees, and distributed the proceeds to the rights
owners. 23
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of American in Congress assembled, [t]hat any copyright
hereafter granted under the laws of the United States to the author or
proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public
representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said
author or proprietor, his heirs or assigned, along with the sole right to
print and publish the said composition, the sole right also to act,
perform, or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or
represented, on any stage or public place during the whole period for
which the copyright is obtained.
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138.
18. Section 4966 of the 1897 Act provided that “[a]ny person publicly performing or
representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a copyright has been
obtained, without the consent of the proprietor of said dramatic or musical composition,
or his heirs or assigns, shall be liable for damages therefor.” Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat.
481.
19. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (“[A]ny
person entitled thereto, upon complying with provisions of this Act, shall have the
exclusive right: . . . (e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a
musical composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit.”). In the most
recent iteration of federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, § 106 provides that
the owner of a copyright in a musical work has the exclusive right to (or to authorize) the
public performance of her copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
20. See THE AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS,
http://www.ascap.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
21. See BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., http://www.bmi.com (last visited July 22, 2014).
22. See THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com (last visited Dec. 30,
2014).
23. See, e.g., ASCAP Payment System: Introduction, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/
members/payment.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). For example, ASCAP members who
subscribe to “ASCAP OnStage” receive payment “for live performances at venues of any
size.” Id. ASCAP claims that through ASCAP OnStage composers can receive royalties
when their music is performed live at venues of all sizes throughout the country. The
composer provides the basic details of the performance and which songs were performed,
and the artist will receive a payment for these live performances with their normal
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Two Supreme Court opinions defining the limits of the public
performance right under the 1909 Act were relevant to the Court’s Aiken
decision. First, in Buck v. Jewell-Lasalle Realty, 24 decided in 1931, Gene
Buck, the then-president of ASCAP, sued the owner of the La Salle
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri for infringement of its members’ public
performance rights. The hotel had a radio receiver that was wired to
speakers in both the hotel’s common areas and private rooms. Programs
received on this central radio receiver could then “be simultaneously heard
throughout the building.” 25 The lower courts denied relief, “on the ground
that [the hotel’s] acts did not constitute a ‘performance’ within the
Copyright Act.” 26 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the
hotel proprietor made available to his guests, through a “radio receiving set
and loud speakers installed in his hotel and under his control and for the
entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical
composition which has been broadcast from a radio transmitting station,
[it] constitute[d] a performance of such composition within the meaning
of 17 U.S.C Sec. 1(e).” 27 The Court applied what was dubbed a
“quantitative test,” 28 so named because of “the quantitative performance
standard employed . . . which can be defined as: ‘How much did the
infringer do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted
work?’” 29
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 30 a case involving an infringement action
against cable television operators who transmitted TV signals into homes.
In the 1960s, Fortnightly Corporation owned and operated a cable
television (CATV) system in rural West Virginia, where the hilly terrain
prevented most of the areas’ residents from receiving over-the-air

ASCAP
distribution.
ASCAP
OnStage,
ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/
members/onstage.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
24. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
25. Id. at 195.
26. Id. (citing Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929)).
27. Id. at 195–96.
28. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127, 133 (3d
Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 133 n.14 (quotations and citations omitted.); cf. id. at 137.
30. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). In
Fortnightly, the Court held that broadcasters are the performers of television
transmissions, and that neither cable television operators nor viewers are “performers”
under the 1909 Act. Id. The cable television systems merely aided the viewer’s ability to
receive the broadcasted signal. Id.
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television broadcasts via an ordinary rooftop antenna. 31 To solve this
problem, Fortnightly sold subscriptions to its system, which consisted “of
antennas located on hills . . . with connecting coaxial cables, strung on
utility poles, to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home
television sets of individual subscribers.” 32 United Artists Television sued
for infringement of its public performance rights to its copyrighted works
that were transmitted over Fortnightly’s system. The lower courts held in
favor of United Artists. 33 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed. First, the Court discussed the growth of technology since the
law’s enactment, and how broadcasters and television viewers were
analogized during the litigation. “Despite . . . deviations from the
conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act
[of 1909], broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and
viewers as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters perform. Viewers
do not perform.” 34 The Court, noting the lack of control CATV operators
had over the programming they transmitted, reversed the lower courts,
holding that CATV operators were more like viewers who did not
perform the programs received. 35 The Court concluded that cable
television “systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast and that ‘ . . .
like viewers . . . do not perform the programs that they . . . carry.” 36 In the
Court’s view, neither the cable television operator nor the viewer was
engaged in a public performance of the copyrighted work at issue.
The Court based its decision on the functional nature of the
equipment used, comparing it to features of equipment found in homes. 37
Fortnightly’s “functional test” is one which asks if “the basic function the

31. Id. at 391.
32. Id. at 392.
33. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967) rev’d, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The
Second Circuit, in reaching its decision, relied on the quantitative test outlined in JewellLaSalle. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396 (“The Court of Appeals thought that the controlling
question in deciding whether the petitioner’s CATV systems ‘performed’ the copyrighted
works was: ‘How much did the [petitioner] do to bring about the viewing and hearing of
a copyrighted work?’” (alteration in original)).
34. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398.
35. Id. at 400–01.
36. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken I), 356 F. Supp. 271, 274
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–01) (omissions in original).
37. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 406.
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equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment
generally furnished by a television viewer.” 38
Jewell-Lasalle and Fortnightly can be seen as early demonstrations of
courts determining an infringement action could either based the
underlying technology or viewed in a “technology blind” manner, with a
rejection of “technology blindness” in favor of determining infringement
based on the underlying technology.
B.

DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION OF THE HOMESTYLE
EXEMPTION

George Aiken’s attempt to provide radio-received music and news to
his customers prompted the Court to decide whether Jewell-Lasalle or
Fortnightly should control with regard to the public performance right and
radio broadcasts in this setting. This Section first discusses Twentieth
Century Fox v. Aiken, 39 Aiken’s vindication by the Supreme Court; this
resulted in the codification of an exemption for what would otherwise be
infringing activities. Congress, however, rejected the Court’s view that
store owners who provide broadcasted music for their customers (Aiken
III), and cable television operators who transmit television broadcasts to
viewers in homes (Fortnightly), were not “performing.” The addition of
the “transmit” clause to the definition of the “public performance” 40
solidified Congress’ rejection of the Court’s rationale. This Section ends
with explorations of how the Homestyle Exemption is impacted by its tie
to the Transmit Clause, and whether the exemption should be narrowly or
broadly construed.
1. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corporation v. Aiken

In 1972, several musicians’ rights organizations sued George Aiken for
failure to pay a public performance license. 41 Aiken owned a chain of small
take-out restaurants in the Pittsburgh area 42 called “George Aiken’s
Chicken.” 43 Each restaurant had seating for about 40 people, though the
majority of the restaurant customers ordered their meals “take-out.” 44
38. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127, 134 (3d Cir.
1974) aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
39. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 153 (1975).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
41. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 153.
42. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken I), 356 F. Supp. 271, 272
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
43. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 152.
44. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272.
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Most of customers stayed in the restaurant for about 10–15 minutes. 45 To
give some “ambiance” to the establishment while clientele waited to pick
up their order, Aiken installed a small transistor radio that was connected
via wires to four speakers in the ceiling of the restaurant, from which
customers and employees heard music and news from local radio
stations. 46
After a bench trial, Judge Weis found Aiken liable for infringing on
the public performance rights of two copyright owners: Mary M. Bourne,
the owner of “Me and My Shadow,” and Twentieth Century Music
Corporation, the owner of the copyright to the musical composition of
“The More I See You.” 47 The District Court had to choose which of two
competing Supreme Court decisions—Jewell-Lasalle Realty 48 or
Fortnightly 49—was determinative. 50 The District Court concluded that
Aiken’s situation was more comparable to that of Jewell-Lasalle, 51 a
“technology blind” viewpoint.
Aiken appealed to the Third Circuit, which overturned the District
Court ruling. 52 Since the 1909 Act did not define “performance”
(something remedied in the 1976 Act), 53 the plaintiffs had argued that
Aiken had publicly performed the musical works “when he switched on his
radio (with four loud speakers attached) and tuned to the station which
was playing these compositions.” 54 The Third Circuit, however, concluded
that Aiken did not “perform” copyrighted musical compositions within the
meaning of the 1909 Act. 55 The appellate court reiterated Fortnightly’s
45. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 152.
46. Id.
47. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272. On March 11, 1972, both of these songs were
broadcasted on WKJF-FM, a radio station out of Pittsburgh, PA, and heard in Aiken’s
restaurant. Id.
48. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
49. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
50. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272.
51. Id. at 275. Damages of $250 for each infringement were assessed to Aiken. Id.
52. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.
1974) aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
53. Id. at 130. (“The District Court recognized, as do we, that the Act itself does
not define ‘performance.’”).
54. Id. The Third Circuit also noted that, as a matter of policy, ASCAP did “not
require[] a license where the commercial establishment ha[d] limited itself to a radio and
one speaker.” Id. at 129.
55. Id. at 137 (“We hold, therefore, that mere extension of the range of audibility of
a broadcast program as ‘extended’ here by the appellant Aiken, cannot be said to
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pronouncement that “[b]roadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.
Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total
television process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as an
active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.” 56
The Third Circuit was able to distinguish Jewell-LaSalle from the facts
in Aiken by utilizing Fortnightly’s “functional” test. 57 In addition, it rejected
Jewell-LaSalle’s “quantitative test” based on quantifying the actions of the
alleged infringer. 58 In Jewell-LaSalle, the broadcast was sent out to the
many rooms in the hotel via a commercial stereo system; in Aiken, the
broadcast was limited to a single room via a system commonly found in
homes. 59
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s holding that viewers
(or listeners) do not perform, but rather are merely passive beneficiaries of
the performance. 60 The Court did affirm its holding in Jewell-LaSalle, but
found it factually distinguished from Aiken. 61 In addition, “[a]s
reinterpreted by the Aiken decision, the rule of Jewell-LaSalle applies only
if the broadcast being re-transmitted was itself unlicensed.” 62 The Court
constitute a ‘performance.’” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court held that the
purpose of the exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work publicly for profit under the
1909 Act
was to prohibit unauthorized performances of copyrighted musical
compositions in such public places as concert halls, theatres,
restaurants, and cabarets . . . . An orchestra or individual
instrumentalist or singer who performs a copyrighted musical
composition in such a public place without a license is thus clearly an
infringer under the statute . . . . But it was never contemplated that the
members of the audience who heard the composition would themselves
also be simultaneously ‘performing’ and thus also guilty of
infringement.
Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975).
56. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161 (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1968)).
57. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 134–135; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–99; Aiken III, 422
U.S. at 161 (“Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.”); see also supra, notes 30–38
and accompanying text.
58. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 133 n.14. For a brief description of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
and its overall relevance to the public performance right, see supra, notes 24–29 and
accompanying text.
59. Cf. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 137.
60. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161, 164.
61. Id. at 160 (“We may assume for present purposes that the Jewell-LaSalle
decision retains authoritative force in a factual situation like that in which it arose.”).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700–01.
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found the language in Fortnightly regarding the listener/viewer as not
“performing” to be dispositive, 63 and emphasized that copyright does not
grant its owner an absolute monopoly. “The Copyright Act [of 1909] does
not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work.
Instead, . . . the Act enumerates several ‘rights’ that are made ‘exclusive’ to
the holder of the copyright.” 64 Any use outside of these rights is not an
infringing action. 65
As exemplified by Aiken and its related cases, questions before the
Court continually revolve around whether actions that utilize technology
that was not yet contemplated when the Act was written constitute
infringement. The technological advancements that occurred during the
tenure of the 1909 Act are breathtaking. Radio, motion pictures, and
television all came of age; the Court had to determine how copyright law
would apply to—and thus regulate—these technologies:
Although Congress did not revise the statutory language,
copyright law was quick to adapt to prevent the exploitation of
protected works through the new electronic technology . . . . It
was soon established in the federal courts that the broadcast of a
copyrighted musical composition by a commercial radio station
was a public performance of that composition for profit—and
thus an infringement of the copyright if not licensed. 66

63. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161 (“The language of the Court’s opinion in the
Fortnightly case could hardly be more explicitly dispositive of the question now before
us.”).
64. Id. at 154–55.
65. Id. at 155 (using the example of singing a copyrighted song in the shower as a
noninfringing act that requires no license from the copyright owner).
66. Id. at 158. The Court continued:
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the listeners
are unable to communicate with one another, or are not assembled
within an inclosure [sic], or gathered together in some open stadium or
park or other public place. Nor can a performance, in our judgment, be
deemed private because each listener may enjoy it alone in the privacy
of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach
a very much larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition
than any other medium of performance.
Id. at 158–59.
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2. Codification into the Copyright Act of 1976

When Congress revised U.S. copyright law via the 1976 Act, it
codified the substance of the Aiken Exemption in § 110(5) as follows: 67
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are
not infringements of copyright: except as provided in
subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission embodying
a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes, unless (i) a direct charge is made to see or
hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is
further transmitted to the public . . . . 68

Congress was concerned with “rent seeking” 69 by copyright owners,
especially when actions like George Aiken’s were usually not subject to
either royalties or litigation, and the copyright owners were already
receiving value for their rights. Congress was also loath to turn the use of

67. Later renumbered § 110(5)(A).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012). Section 106 of the Act enumerates six rights
afforded to copyright owners: the (1) reproduction, (2) adaptation, (3) distribution, (4)
public performance, (5) public display, and (6) digital broadcasts of sound recordings.
The public performance right does not apply to any copyright in sound recordings (nor
does the public display right); however, § 106(4) does apply to the copyright in the
underlying musical composition. Thus, to broadcast/transmit a song over the radio, a
license is needed from the copyright owner in the musical composition, but not from the
owner of the copyright in the sound recording. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
69. “Rent-seeking” can be defined “as the actions and decisions of political actors
that result in wealth transfers which reduce the economic wellbeing of society.” Thomas
M. Murray, The U.S.-French Dispute Over GATT Treatment of Audiovisual Products and
the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution Was “Rent-Seeking,” 21
MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 203, 203–04 (1997) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 34 (1991) (“When economists describe special
interest legislation as ‘rent-seeking,’ they mean that the legislation is not justified on a
cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than it benefits the special interest, so society
as a whole is worse off.”)).
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an “ordinary receiver” into a potentially infringing act 70 when there was no
commercial advantage gained. 71
The legislative history illustrates however, that while Congress agreed
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Aiken, it rejected the Court’s
rationale that Aiken, his customers, and his employees were passive
listeners, and that Aiken’s broadcast did not constitute public
performance. 72 Instead, the legislature chose to declare that while such use
70. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700.
The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the
transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote
and minimal that no further liability should be imposed. In the vast
majority of these cases no royalties are collected today, and the
exemption should be made explicit in the statute.
Id.
71. John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions in the
Construction of 17 U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 783, 831 (1993). Mr. Wilk
believes that
[t]he legislative rationale of section 110(5) appears to be that, in some
instances, commercial establishments were receiving commercial
advantage from playing radio broadcasts and should, therefore, be
subject to copyright infringement liability. The statutory and legislative
factors of section 110(5) merely serve as a test to differentiate
establishments that are receiving a commercial benefit from those that
are not.
Id. at 831. Yet it is debatable as to whether this blanket statement is always true. Retail
stores like The Gap or Claire’s arguably attain no commercial advantage from playing
music though a Homestyle-qualifying system versus a commercial system. For sports
restaurants or bars, however, there may be a commercial advantage to using a professional
sound system. Section 110(5)(B) seeks to differentiate between the types of business
establishments and whether they qualify for the Exemption, but the underlying rationale
remains what Wilk claims it is.
72. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5700.
The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision
on a narrow construction of the word ‘perform’ in the 1909 statute.
This basis for the decision is completely overturned by the present bill
and its broad definition of ‘perform’ in section 101. The Committee
has adopted the language of section 110(5), with an amendment
expressly denying the exemption in situations where ‘the performance
or display is further transmitted beyond the place where the receiving
apparatus is located’; in doing so, it accepts the traditional, pre-Aiken,
interpretation by means other than a home receiving set, or further
transmission of a broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing
act.
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was a public performance, the newly enacted § 110(5) exempted such
public performances from infringing on the exclusive right held by the
copyright owner. 73
Congress also remedied the lack of a definition of “public
performance” in the 1909 Act—the 1976 Act declares that a work is
“performed publicly” when “it is at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
family and its social acquaintances is gathered, . . . [or a performance]
transmit[ted] or otherwise communicate . . . to the public.” 74 Thus, if
there was no § 110(5) exemption, the performing of a musical work in a
store or restaurant via a radio broadcast, without the permission of the
copyright owner, would infringe on the copyright owner’s public
performance right. 75
Congress also made clear that this exemption applies to all
performances—it removed the “for profit” language from the public
performance right granted 76 in the 1909 Act. 77 When discussing the public
Id. at 87.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012) (“Not withstanding the provisions of section 106,
the following are not infringements of copyright: . . . communication of a transmission
embodying a performance . . . of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes.”).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2012) (to perform or display a work “publicly”). Subsection
(2) expands the definition of performing a work publicly to include the transmission of
visual and audio signals, such as through radio and television broadcasts, as public
performances. Specifically, it states:
To perform . . . a work “publicly” means . . . (2) to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance . . . to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize the following: . . . in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).
76. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . [anyone] to perform the copyrighted work
publicly”), with Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (“[A]ny
person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have the
exclusive right . . . [t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit.” (emphasis added)).
77. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700. The statute notes that:
Unlike the first four clauses of section 110, clause (5) is not to any
extent a counterpart of the ‘for profit’ limitation of the present statute.
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performance right with regard to the Homestyle Exemption, Congress
focused on “reception in public.” 78 Congress was equally clear in whom
they viewed as the recipients of their largess through the Homestyle
Exemption, and where they drew its limits:
Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case, assuming a
small commercial establishment and the use of a home receiver
with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped within a relatively
narrow circumference from the set, it is intended that the
performances would be exempt from clause (5). However, the
Committee considers this fact situation to represent the outer
limit of the exemption, and believes that the line should be
drawn at that point. Thus, the clause would exempt small
commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto
their premises standard radio or television equipment and turn it
on for their customers’ enjoyment, but it would impose liability
where the proprietor has a commercial “sound system” installed
or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (by augmenting
it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment) into
the equivalent of a commercial sound system. 79

Congress also rejected the safe harbor the Court gave to cable
television operators 80 in Fortnightly 81 (and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.). 82 Section 110(5) did not provide an exemption

Id.

It applies to performances and displays of all types of works, and its
purpose is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns
on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for private use.

78. Id. The section of the report relating to the Homestyle Exemption is titled
“Mere reception in public.” Id.
79. Id. at 87, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
80. As noted supra, the Court’s decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191
(1931), distinguished between licensed and unlicensed transmissions to determine
whether the recipient of the transmission was infringing on the copyright owner’s public
performance right.
81. See 392 U.S. § 390 (1968).
82. See 415 U.S. § 394 (1974).
When enacting Section 110(5), Congress noted that the Supreme
Court based its decision in Aiken decision on two Supreme Court
decisions dealing with cable television. In Fortnightly and again in
Teleprompter, where the Court held “a CATV operator was not
‘performing’ within the meaning of the 1909 statute, when it picked up
broadcast signals off the air and retransmitted them to subscribers by
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for cable television retransmissions (in rebuttal to the Supreme Court),
and commercializing a retransmitted broadcast continued to be what
defined an infringing act (affirming the Court). 83 Congress did not,
however—as illustrated by the technology-heavy language it used in
creating the Homestyle Exemption—resort to a “technology blind” way of
achieving this result.
3. The Meaning of “Transmit”

“Transmit” was not defined in the 1909 Act, and thus courts were left
to define it, as well as to decide who transmitted and thus publicly
performed a copyrighted work. 84 In the 1976 Act, Congress remedied this
omission: “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to communicate it by any
cable.” The Aiken decision extends this interpretation of the scope of
the 1909 statute’s right of ‘public performance for profit’ to a
stipulation outside the CATV context and, without expressly overruling
the decision in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931),
effectively deprives it of much meaning under the present law. For
more than forty years the Jewell-LaSalle rule was thought to require a
business establishment to obtain copyright licenses before it could
legally pick up any broadcasts off the air and retransmit them to its
guests and patrons.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5700–
01.
83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700 (stating that the Homestyle Exemption had “nothing to do with cable television
systems and the exemptions would be denied in any case where the audience is charged
directly to see or hear the transmission”). It should also be noted that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has concluded that the Homestyle Exemption is in violation of
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), an international treaty of
which the United States is a signatory. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). A
WTO panel found that § 110(5), as amended by the FMLA 1998, was incompatible
with Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention because it failed to meet the
requirements of Article 11bis(2) of that Convention. Put differently, “since Section
110(5) did not provide authors and composers with at least an equitable remuneration, it
was in breach of Article 11bis as incorporated in the TRIPs Agreement.” See Makeen F.
Makeen, The Reception in Public Dilemma Under U.S. Copyright Law, 58 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S. 355, 395–418 (2011) (citing First Oral Statement of the European
Communities, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, para. 51, WT/DS
160/R (Nov. 8, 1999); First Written Submission of the European Communities, United
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 77, WT/DS 160/R (Oct. 5, 1999)). Prof.
Makeen’s article provides an in-depth analysis of the WTO’s conclusions regarding how
the Homestyle Exemption violates TRIPs.
84. Radio telegraphy was in its infancy, with only extremely limited, experimental
use. See, e.g., Invention of Radio, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invention
_of_radio#Wireless_Telegraphy_2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place
from which they are sent.” 85 Yet there are several relevant questions that
still need to be addressed with regard to the Transmit Clause. First, while
it appears to be facially “technology neutral,” (that is, it contains no
technology-specific language) the clause is rarely read in a vacuum, but
rather is read in conjunction with another section of the 1976 Act that
may be reliant on technology, such as the technology-dependent
Homestyle Exemption. Second, it is necessary to determine whether
“transmit” requires that the sound recording’s signal actually be received
and performed elsewhere, or whether merely “making the signal available”
satisfies the definition. Must there be an actual “third party”
recipient/broadcaster of the signal sent through the storeowner’s wireless
speaker system? Some guidance may be found in recent court
interpretations of the Transmit Clause to include the potential audience
for a performance, not merely the actual audience. In Cartoon Network LP
v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (aka Cablevision), 86 the Second Circuit held that the
Transmit Clause required a court “to discern who is ‘capable of receiving’
the performance being transmitted” when “determining whether a
transmission is made to the public.” 87
In that decision, CSC Holdings (“Cablevision”) was the operator of a
cable television system that allowed its customers to remotely record TV
programs using a device called a Remote-Storage DVR (RS-DVR). 88 For
customers who did not have stand-alone VCRs or DVD/DVR players, 89
this device allowed viewers to record programs in the same manner that
these home devices did, 90 only at a remote location. 91 Various copyright
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
86. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2008).
87. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38
(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134–35 (2d Cir. 2008)).
88. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
89. Indeed, by the time Cablevision launched its RS-DVR service, “many cable
companies . . . already offered their customers set-top boxes that added DVR
functionality to their subscriptions, and none had been sued for doing so.” Rebecca
Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk about Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business
Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause 8 (Columbia Law
& Economics Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 480, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443595.
90. Recording programs on a VCR had already been found to be a noninfringing
use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
91. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124.
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owners sued Cablevision for infringement of their public performance
rights, claiming that this RS-DVR would “directly infringe their exclusive
rights to both reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works.” 92
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against Cablevision, holding that under Sony v. Universal
Pictures, 93 as well as National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint
Venture, 94 Cablevision’s device did not directly infringe. 95 Included in the
court’s rationale 96 was its conclusion that Cablevision’s device did not
directly infringe 97 because it was not publicly performing the copyrighted
works; its conduct did not meet the definition of “transmit to the public”
under the 1976 Act because “the RS-DVR playback . . . does not involve
the transmission of a performance ‘to the public.’” 98 The court focused on
determining who constituted the “potential audience” of a given
transmission by an alleged infringer in order to evaluate whether the
transmission was “to the public.” 99 It held that “because the RS-DVR
system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a
copy made by that subscriber . . . the universe of people capable of
receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose selfmade copy is used to create that transmission.” 100 Cablevision’s activities
therefore did not constitute a public performance. 101
With regard to who constitutes the “potential audience” of a
performance, there is very little guidance present in the case law or by
Congress. One option is to look to the distribution right and how courts

92. Id.
93. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
94. 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000).
95. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123, 140.
96. The court also provided a lengthy discussion regarding “volitional conduct”—
that despite copyright infringement’s strict liability standard, “there should still be some
element of volition of causation”—it was the individual customer directing the recording
and subsequent playback. Id. at 130.
97. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 140.
98. Id. at 536 F.3d at 134–135 (“[E]ach RS-DVR transmission is made using a
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one that can be decoded
exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any
given RS-DVR transmission.”).
99. Id. at 137.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 138 (“Given that each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber
using a copy made by that subscriber, we conclude that such a transmission is not ‘to the
public.’”).
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have construed the “making available” right, 102 though there is a split in
the circuits. A court trying to analogize to “making available” could follow
the Fourth and Second Circuits, which hold that making a copy available
to the public is a public distribution, even if there is no evidence of
someone actually receiving, requesting, or looking at the work. 103
Alternatively, courts in the First, Ninth and Eighth Circuits hold that
making an offer to distribute does not qualify as a distribution. 104 Thus,
using this latter rationale, a court could find that an actual transmission
and infringing broadcast to an audience is required for there to be
infringement, rather than merely making the transmission “available,” or
could find the opposite.
4. Construing Exemptions

While the link between the Transmit Clause and the Homestyle
Exemption supports the argument that technology matters, any exemption
from copyright infringement may also be limited based on statutory
construction. Thus, how courts generally construe the statutory language
of § 110(5) has a profound effect on whether a wireless speaker system
falls within the Homestyle Exemption. The courts and Congress have
provided some guidance beyond the general adage that rights should be
construed broadly, and exemptions should be construed narrowly, as
exemplified in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus:
[C]opyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed, with a
view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought
not to be unduly extended by judicial construction to include
privileges not intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly
construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of the
rights Congress intended to grant. 105

102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (“The owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . to distribute copies . . . of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending.”).
103. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201
(4th Cir. 1997); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
104. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
105. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
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Congress emphatically delineated the Homestyle Exemption’s outer limit,
consigning the further determination of its boundaries to the judiciary. 106
In addition, there is ample evidence that courts already narrowly construe
the statutory exceptions to a copyright owner’s rights. For example, in
Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit construed the first sale doctrine narrowly with regard to sound
recordings of musical works. 107 The Ninth Circuit has declared that the
computer program exception under “Section 117 [of the Copyright Act]
defines a narrow category of copying that is lawful per se.” 108 And the
Eleventh Circuit has held the § 119 exception enacted through the
Satellite Home Viewer Act to be a narrow exception. 109
106. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
107. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 374
(6th Cir. 2007).
Thus, § 109(b)(1)(A) is best read as providing only a limited exception
to the first-sale doctrine for sound recordings of musical works. When
considered with the legislative history and the policy rationales
underlying the Copyright Act, Congress’s use of the phrase “and in the
musical works embodied therein” limits the statute’s application to only
those sound recordings that contain musical works. The language of
the statute does not unambiguously apply to audiobooks, and we have
found no evidence that it should be so construed.
Id.; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368, 369 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment in 1984 as a narrow exception to the
‘first sale doctrine,’ which limits a copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute his
copyrighted material to his first sale of that material.”).
108. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, in a case involving the copying of a computer
program. The lower court stated that § 117 was a narrow exception, a finding of law that
was affirmed—albeit briefly—by the appellate court.
Section 117 allows an owner of a program to make a copy where the
copy is an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and it is used in no other manner. This
narrow exception to the copyright act allows an owner of a program to
load it into his computer for use, which involves making a copy in the
machine memory.
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(quotations and citations omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992).
109. See CBS, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’n Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that the Satellite Home Viewer Act “creates a narrow exception to the
generally applicable, and constitutional, Copyright Act”). Other narrowly construed
exceptions include the implied license as a defense to copyright infringement. See
McIntosh v. N. Cal. Universal Enters. Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1090 (E.D. Cal.
2009) (“A ‘narrow exception to the writing requirement’ is an implied nonexclusive
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Conversely, Congress’s vagueness in drafting § 110(5) could support
the argument that this section should be construed in a slightly broader
manner; its “[l]egislative history is a proper guide in interpreting the
somewhat ambiguous notion of a home-type system” 110 that qualifies for
the exemption. After all, Congress began its report on the 1976 Act by
observing that
significant changes in technology have affected the operation of
the copyright law. Motion pictures and sound recordings had
just made their appearance in 1909, and radio and television
were still in the early stages of their development. During the
past half century a wide range of new techniques for capturing
and communicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded
sounds have come into use, and the increasing use of information
storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites, and laser
technology promises even greater changes in the near future. The
technical advances have generated new industries and new
methods for the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted
works, and the business relations between authors and users have
evolved new patterns. 111

Thus, while the “outer boundary” language in the legislative history
supports a narrowly defined construction of the Homestyle Exception, this
license to use the copyrighted work.” (quoting Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d
555, 558–559 (9th Cir. 1990)).
110. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir.
1991).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5660 (indicating that in determining what would be copyrightable in the future, Congress
purposely chose broad language to encompass future mediums of expression with
copyrightability of original works of authorship).
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but
it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods
will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications
technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely
outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither
that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression
within that general area of subject matter would necessarily be
unprotected. The historic expansion of copyright has also applied to
forms of expression which, although in existence for generations or
centuries, have only gradually come to be recognized as creative and
worthy of protection.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665–
64.
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same legislative history also provides support for broadly construing
§ 110(5) to encompass technologies not anticipated at the time of its
enactment. 112
C.

THE WIRED SPEAKER SYSTEM ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED

When Congress codified the Aiken Exemption into § 110(5) of the
Copyright Act, the stereo system envisioned consisted of a radio receiver
connected via wires to one or more speakers, either contained within the
radio or attached to the radio receiver.

Figure 1: Basic Diagram of a Radio Receiver with Wired Speakers113

In this system depicted in Figure 1, when the signal broadcasted from
the radio station reaches a radio receiver, it converts the signal into an
electrical impulse. 114 The receiver then sends this electrical impulse
through an internal or external wire to the speaker or speakers. Finally, the
speakers translate the electrical impulse into pulses that vibrate the
speaker’s woofer and tweeter, creating the sound we hear.

112. In its legislative history, Congress was cognizant that unanticipated future
technologies could be used to create copyrighted works, and did not want to constantly
have to revisit the Act to expand what kinds of works should be covered.
113. Adapted from U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 2008/0137879A1 fig. 1 (filed
April 24, 2006).
114. Tom Harris, How Speakers Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://electronics
.howstuffworks.com/speaker5.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
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DIY: HOOKING UP WIRELESS SPEAKERS TO YOUR HOME
STEREO

As illustrated in Figure 2, a wireless speaker system consists of a
transmitter that attaches to (or is part of) the radio receiver and wireless
speakers. The wireless speakers are essentially combination radio
receivers/speaker units. Rather than receiving the audio signal through
audio cables like wired speakers, wireless speakers receive the audio signal
through either open radio waves, a “Bluetooth” dedicated signal, or a
wireless Ethernet system (e.g., Wi-Fi). 115 The speakers then translate the
signal into sound. “Wireless” refers to the lack of a wire that sends sound
from the stereo receiver to the speaker, not a lack of all wires. Thus, while
some wireless speakers have cords connecting the speaker to an electrical
outlet (other speaker types are powered by batteries), these are still called
“wireless.” 116

Figure 2: Basic Diagram of a Radio Receiver with wireless speakers117

Some newer audio receivers have built-in transmitters, while older
models may be modified for wireless speakers by attaching a transmitter to
115. Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014),
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers-/
10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
116. Id.
117. Adapted from U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 20080137879A1200/801378
79A1 fig. 1 (filed April 24, 2006).
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the audio receiver. All wireless speakers contain built-in receivers that pick
up the signal sent by the wireless transmitter. As discussed infra,
deciphering what Congress meant with regard to both “receiving
apparatus” and “further transmission” has a direct effect on whether a
wireless speaker system falls within the Homestyle Exemption. These
required features must be examined not in the abstract, but with regard to
the specific technology used in each of the three types of wireless speaker
systems.
E.

THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT AIKEN/HOMESTYLE
EXEMPTION TEST

As previously stated, Congress intended to “exempt small commercial
establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises
standard radio or television equipment and turn it on for their customers’
enjoyment.” 118 To successfully claim the § 110(5) exemption, courts
require defendants to satisfy three technology-specific elements. 119 First
their system “must be of a kind commonly used in private homes.” 120
118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87–88 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5700–01.
119. See Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont.
1990) (“[D]efendants carry the burden of proving that their restaurant falls within the
framework of the § 110(5) exemption.”).
120. See id. (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir.
1988)). Through the enactment of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FIMLA) of
1998, § 110(5)(B) was added, and the former § 110(5) was recodified as § 110(5)(A).
This new section was an attempt to expand and clarify the limits on the size of the
eating/drinking establishment and the number of speakers and/or televisions that can be
used based on the business’s physical size. Section 110(5)(B) did not repeal the original
Homestyle Exemption.
Rather, it add[ed] a new and additional exemption for performances of
nondramatic musical works that is based not on the use of “homestyle”
receiving equipment but rather on the size of the establishment and the
number of speakers or television sets used to transmit the music. The
FIMLA grants a blanket licensing exemption to retail establishments
that are smaller than 2000 square feet and to food service or drinking
establishments that are smaller than 3750 square feet.
Lawrence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPs and Economic Analysis of
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93, 97 (2000). Section 110(5)(B)
retains the proviso of “no transmission” of Section 110(5)(A). 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iv)
(2012). It states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not
infringements of copyright: . . . communication by an establishment of
a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of
a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general
public, originated by a radio or television broadcast station licensed as
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Second, it must have only a single receiving apparatus. 121 And third, the
performances cannot “be ‘further transmitted’ to the public.” 122
1. The First Element: Commonly Found in a Home

The first element—that the system “must be of a kind commonly used
in private homes” 123—has a dynamic demarcation line that moves with the
state of the contemporary technology as innovations transition from
commercial to home use. Congress attempted to provide courts with the
following guidance:
Factors to consider . . . include the size, physical arrangement,
and noise level of the areas within the establishment where the
transmissions are made audible or visible, and the extent to
which the receiving apparatus is altered or augmented for the
purpose of improving the aural or visual quality of the
performance for individual members of the public using those
areas. 124

Congress clearly anticipated that courts would, and should, examine
the technology at issue when making a determination regarding the
Homestyle Exemption. 125 Scholars have also noted Congress’s awareness
of this issue when it first proposed the exemption, and its refusal to
address those who raised concerns that technological advances might
undermine the protection based on the “homestyle receiving apparatus”
language. 126 The witnesses at the congressional hearings expressed concern
that defining an exemption “in terms of a technological norm will fail to
such by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual
transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if . . . the
transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the
establishment where it is received.
Id. The intricacies of § 110(5)(B) are not pertinent to the focus of this Article. For
further information regarding § 110(5)(B), see Helfer, supra.
121. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037 (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v.
Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5701.
125. See Wilk, supra note 71, at 785 (noting that “the standard is not stable, as
advances in technology continually redefine the parameters of the homestyle equipment
standard”).
126. Id. at 839–40 (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680,
6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965)).
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reflect the changes in that norm.” 127 The legislative history 128 and use of
the phrase in the 1976 Act “now known or later developed” 129 also
intimates that Congress anticipated new technologies. This language in
the 1976 Act has already allowed new technologies to be considered
“tangible mediums of expression” without an act of Congress, unlike what
was required to encompass new technologies under earlier versions of the
Act.
Since Congress was highly cognizant of technological advancement
and its effect on the proliferation of copyrightable subject matter, arguably
the interpretation of § 110(5) should also expand to encompass new
technologies based on their proliferation in residences. Indeed, historical
applications of the Homestyle Exemption demonstrate that, as
commercial uses found their way into homes, courts adjusted their
holdings accordingly. Appellate courts, when weighing in on a § 110(5)
exemption, are already keen as to whether the system installed in the
business had been altered from a common residential/home system to a
more commercial one. A “company may not claim the exemption if it
configures and uses home-type components in a manner not commonly
found in a home.” 130
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, when
considering whether the receiving apparatus was one “commonly used in
private homes,” the Seventh Circuit examined whether “the company
use[d] any non-home-type components in its stereo system” because such
use would render the system “not home-type.” 131 The appellate court
opined that in determining whether a home-style receiving apparatus has
127. Id. (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965); David E.
Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill: Recent Developments in
Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 481 (1987)).
The congressional witnesses, however, viewed the exemption from the opposite side: that
“establishments currently using commercial equipment and paying licensing fees will
gradually become exempt as technological advances enable them to make use of
homestyle equipment.” Id.
128. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” (emphasis added)).
130. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir.
1991) (citing Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont.
1990)).
131. Id. at 1493.
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been adapted into one for commercial use, the court needed to examine
the system and whether it was equipped with additional components that
expanded the receiver’s normal capabilities. 132
In Claire’s, the court analyzed a system where the receiver was located
in the back room of each of the defendant’s stores, with wires connecting
it to speakers on the sales floor. 133 At issue was whether the receiving
apparatus used in each of the Claire’s shops was one “commonly used in
private homes.” 134 The court examined whether “the company use[d] any
non-home-type components in its stereo system,” or augmented a
homestyle stereo system 135 because such use would render the system “not
home-type.” 136 A determination on these facts would be dispositive to the
court’s holding because a company “may not claim the exemption if it
configures and uses home-type components in a manner not commonly
found in a home.” 137 Based on the facts presented, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendant’s systems used in the
stores fell within the Homestyle Exemption. 138
There are also many examples of different courts reaching opposite
conclusions about the same technology. In 1988, when in-wall speaker
wires were not commonly found in homes, Judge Prado in the Western
District of Texas found that having in-wall wiring for speakers and
locating the stereo receiver in a separate room was “commercial in
nature.” 139 Yet, in 1991, the internal wiring used in the Claire’s Boutiques
132. Id. at 1495.
133. Id.
134. Id at 1492–94.
135. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d,
668 F.2d. 84 (2d Cir. 1981). In Sailor Music, the district court found that the defendant’s
stores were very big—over 3500 square feet—and thus were not the “small commercial
establishment” envisioned by Congress. The court further found that the stores had
augmented the homestyle stereo system to accommodate the large size, converting them
“into the equivalent of a commercial sound system,” thus failing two of the three elements
required for a successful Aiken Exemption defense. Id.
136. Broadcast Music, 949 F.2d at 1493.
137. Id. (citing Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D.
Mont. 1990)).
138. Id. at 1495.
139. Merrill v. Bill Miller’s Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (W.D.
Tex. 1988); see also Hickory Grove, 749 F. Supp. at 1038. Twenty-five years ago, courts
determined that “recessed ceiling speakers attached to a receiving apparatus by a
substantial length of hidden wiring do not constitute ‘home-type’ systems.” Hickory
Grove, 749 F. Supp. at 1038 (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyck, 855 F.2d 375, 378
(7th Cir. 1988)). Yet today, these setups are commonly found in residences, and are often

1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF _06032015 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

AIKEN MEETS AEREO

11/2/2015 9:35 PM

1413

stores was afforded “minimal weight.” 140 The court reasoned that, while
such wired systems might not be prevalent in homes, 141 the system bore a
striking resemblance to the four speakers installed by Aiken, which
Congress declared as the “outer limit.” 142 Courts have been dynamic in
their holdings as specific technological advancements become more widely
available; there is ample evidence that they do not maintain a static view of
technology’s proliferation from commercial settings to home use.
Today, because many homes contain internally wired stereo systems—
often installed during the home’s construction—a store’s in-wall stereo
wires would likely fall within the Exemption. Just as high-quality, digital,
single-lens reflex cameras (now so easy to use that even a monkey can take
great “selfies” 143) and flat screen televisions formerly were out of reach for
most consumers, their now-widespread adoption has moved them from
“business only” to general use. Likewise, internally wired speaker systems
and high-end digital receivers now fall under the Homestyle Exemption’s
umbrella.
installed while a home is being built. See, e.g., Running the Wires for Structured Wiring,
STRUCTURED HOME WIRING, http://www.structuredhomewiring.com/Structured
Wiring.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
140. Broadcast Music, 949 F.2d at 1494.
141. Id. It seems that in the 1990s, people living in the Seventh Circuit were more
likely to have familiarity with these stereo systems than people living in Montana.
142. Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that “if Congress wanted the rule to be that
the receiver must be in the same room as the speaker for the exemption to apply, it could
have easily said so.” Id. at 1495.
143. Jordan Weissmann, If a Monkey Takes a Selfie, Who Owns the Copyright?, SLATE
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/08/06/monkey_selfie_who
_owns_the_copyright.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). In its recently released, updated
Compendium draft, the Copyright Office responded to this query:
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that
“are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” Because copyright
law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the
Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being
did not create the work . . . . The Office will not register works
produced by nature, animals, or plants. Likewise, the Office cannot
register a work purportedly created by divine or supernatural beings,
although the Office may register a work where the application or the
deposit copy(ies) state that the work was inspired by a divine spirit.
U.S. Copyright Office, § 306 The Human Authorship Requirement, in COMPENDIUM OF
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 54 (public draft Aug. 19, 2014) (citations
omitted), available at http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf; U.S. Copyright
Office, § 313.2 Works That Lack Human Authorship, in COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 54 (public draft Aug. 19, 2014) (citations omitted),
available at http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-full.pdf.
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Similarly, while once rare, wireless receiver/audio/stereo systems are
now very common in homes. All of the major audio manufacturers and
distributors extensively market wireless speakers (some of which are made
to adapt existing wired systems), as well as entire home entertainment
systems that rely exclusively on wireless speakers. 144 That there are
currently three separate forms of technology in competition in the wireless
stereo market is itself an indication of their growth and adoption by
audiophile consumers. Some contemporary receiving apparatuses have
built-in transmitters for use with compatible wireless speakers and are
commonly sold for home use. 145 Other wireless speaker systems have been
developed to adapt to a standard stereo receiver using a transmitter
attached to the receiver, which then transmits the signal to the speakers. 146
One should question whether it matters if the system is added to an older
receiver or if it is integrated. Or is this the wrong inquiry—should the
threshold instead be whether the device is available and commonly used by
consumers?
Thus, the movement of technology from purely commercial settings
into homes is of utmost importance when evaluating a stereo system for
compliance with the Homestyle Exemption. To be blind to either
technological advancement or its proliferation would be a mistake for any
court when issuing a finding of fact or conclusion at law with regard to a
§ 110(5) defense. While some systems would fit within this element’s
Aiken safe harbor, 147 there is still the matter of the explicit language in the
statute regarding a “single receiving apparatus” and the prohibition on
“retransmission” beyond what courts have allowed—that is, allowing the
receiver and speakers to be located in adjoining rooms, connected via inwall wires.
144. See, e.g., Press Release, Sonos, Introducing the Sonos PLAY:1 (Oct. 14, 2013),
available at http://www.sonos.com/press/press-releases/introducing-sonos-play-1; Press
Release, Bose, Bose Introduces New SoundLink Mini Bluetooth Speaker II (June 4,
2014), available at http://globalpressroom.bose.com/us-en/pressrelease/view/1509.
145. See, e.g., Sonos Connect, SONOS, http://www.sonos.com/shop/connect (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015).
146. See, e.g., Bose Bluetooth Audio Adapter, BOSE, http://www.bose.com/products/
speaker_accessories/bose-bluetooth-audio-adapter.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
147. As noted supra in note 119, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the receiving
apparatus is a kind commonly used in private homes; (2) the broadcast cannot be further
transmitted to the public; and (3) the defendant’s business is a small commercial
establishment. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont.
1990) (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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2. The Second Element: The Quandary of Multiple Receivers

The second element to satisfy for the Homestyle Exemption requires
that the system have a “single receiving apparatus.” 148 Because wireless
systems are, by their nature, composed of multiple receivers—the base that
receives the radio broadcast signal and the receivers located in each speaker
that receive signals from the base—they could be ineligible for the
Homestyle Exemption. This will depend on whether a court construes “a
single receiving apparatus” 149 to strictly mean just the receiver component,
or more broadly to encompass the entire stereo receiving system. Under a
strict construction of the statute, wireless systems likely fall beyond the
Homestyle Exemption’s outer limits, even though the additional receivers
are merely substitutes for speaker wires.
Alternatively, a court could interpret the receivers in wireless speakers
as part of a “single receiving apparatus.” Claire’s Boutiques defines
“receiving apparatus” as encompassing “the receiver, speakers, antenna and
wiring.” 150 The Seventh Circuit concluded that this was the proper
definition Congress intended, because
Congress could have, as it does in the legislative history, simply
used the word “receiver” if it had wanted to limit the analysis. In
addition, “apparatus” is defined as “the totality of means by
which a designated function is performed * * * [or] a group of
machines used together * * * to accomplish a task. A stereo
system fits neatly into this definition of apparatus; it uses all its
components to perform the task of converting radio waves into
audible sound waves. 151

3. The Third Element: The Dilemma of the Second Transmitter

Finally, § 110(5) requires that there be no retransmission of the radio
signal. 152 A retransmission—even one that merely goes from the receiver
148. Id. at 1037.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106,
the following are not infringements of copyright: communication of a transmission
embodying a performance . . . of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
150. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir.
1991).
151. Id. (citations omitted) (modifications in original).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A)(ii) (stating that the exception does not apply if “the
transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public”); Hickory Grove Music v.
Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 1990) (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v.
Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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to the speaker—could render the Homestyle Exemption inapplicable. Yet
such a retransmission is a key feature of any type of wireless speaker
system currently available. 153 For a wireless speaker system to function, the
sound signal must be retransmitted from the stereo base to the speaker’s
receiver. 154 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Claire’s Boutiques,
defining further transmission as using “some device or process that
expands the normal limits of the receiver’s capabilities,” 155 could be a fatal
blow for wireless systems.
This final element also illustrates how the Transmit Clause and
technology may be irretrievably linked, and how the clause is open to
different interpretations. Is a transmission that can be heard on speakers
located outside the store’s system (i.e., an “open” system) what Congress
intended to prohibit? Or is transmission within a “closed” system—
whereby the radio signal is limited to the store’s speakers—also within the
intended definition of “transmit” with regard to a public performance
right, and thus a deal-breaker for the Homestyle Exemption? If Congress
intended that there could be no retransmission outside of a closed system,
then we need to address whether there must be an actual recipient of the
signal who intercepts and broadcasts the signal in a nearby store. If not—
that is, if “transmit” does not require that a potential audience be capable
of receiving the signal—then the form of wireless speakers also matters.
The next Part discusses these issues.
III.

APPLYING AIKEN TO WIRELESS SPEAKERS

Regardless of whether they are built-in or added-on, contemporary
wireless systems come in three forms. First, there are those that transmit
over a standard radio frequency (RF). A second type also transmits an RF
signal, but in a closed system, such as Bluetooth. 156 Finally, there are those
153. See infra notes 162–175 and accompanying text.
154. See Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014),
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers/10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015); see also J.D. Biersdorfer,
Wirelessly Moving Music from Gadgets to the Stereo, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/technology/personaltech/25basics.html.
155. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir.
1991).
156. Generally, Bluetooth is a communications system that “exchanges data over
short distances using radio transmissions.” Welcome to Bluetooth Technology 101,
BLUETOOTH, http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/Fast-Facts.aspx (last visited Oct. 2,
2014). The transmission distance for a Bluetooth signal is much shorter than that used in
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that transmit through an internal intranet Wi-Fi 157 system, dubbed by the
consumer electronics industry as “Play-Fi.” 158 While they can be
generalized as systems where a transmitter sends a signal to receivers
located in wireless speakers, all three work in very different ways that
could affect how a court views their eligibility for the Homestyle
Exemption. Merely relying on radio signals does not make them the same
as traditional radio signals used by AM and FM radio stations to transmit
their broadcasts. To treat them as such through “technology blindness”
ignores fundamental differences—based on how the exemption is
construed—that could otherwise find the equipment within the
exemption’s safe harbor. Thus, for each of the three forms of wireless
speaker systems, we must examine whether this transmission from the
receiver to the wireless speakers can be seen otherwise than constituting a
prohibited retransmission. 159
For many courts, one particularly relevant characteristic of wireless
systems is whether the system is technologically “open” or “closed.” In a
mobile phones, television, or FM radio signals. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see
infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. See also IEEE STANDARD FOR
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 802.15.1-2005 (2005); Specification Adopted Documents,
BLUETOOTH, https://www.bluetooth.org/en-us/specification/adopted-specifications (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015).
157. According to “How Stuff Works,” Wi-Fi is a wireless network that
uses radio waves, just like cell phones, televisions and radios do. . . .
....
1. A computer’s wireless adapter translates data into a radio signal and
transmits it using an antenna.
2. A wireless router receives the signal and decodes it. The router sends
the information to the Internet using a physical, wired Ethernet
connection.
The process also works in reverse, with the router receiving information
from the Internet, translating it into a radio signal and sending it to the
computer’s wireless adapter.
Marshall Brain, Tracy V. Wilson & Bernadette Johnson, How Wi-Fi Works, HOW
STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/wireless-network1.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2014); see also IEEE STANDARD FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 802.112012 (2012); Wi-Fi, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi (last visited Sept.
7, 2014).
158. Ty Pendlebury, Streaming-Audio App Play-Fi Takes on Sonos and AirPlay, CNET
(Sept. 24, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/streaming-audio-app-play-fitakes-on-sonos-and-airplay. For a complete explanation of Play-Fi, see infra notes 172–
175 and accompanying text.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to communicate it
by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent.”).
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closed system, the transmitter specifically limits which speakers can receive
the data. In contrast, an open system indiscriminately provides
information that can be received both by the intended speakers and by
others nearby.
Wired systems, by nature, are “closed” systems, and this feature could
lead a court to conclude that it is the “closed” nature of wired systems
should be considered when analyzing wireless speaker technologies. As
discussed supra, a closed system’s potential audience is limited to
customers in the store. While Bluetooth and encrypted Play-Fi system
speakers operate via a closed system, traditional RF and unencrypted PlayFi are “open”; the potential audience is much broader, and includes
whoever can locate a speaker to capture and perform the musical
work/sound recording. And whether courts will consider the difference
between open and closed systems in applying the Homestyle Exemption
depends on whether courts take technology into consideration. Based on
the above discussions, courts should examine each of the three systems
using the following assumptions: (1) that Congress intended there be no
retransmission outside a closed system, 160 and (2) that “making the
transmission available” meets the definition of retransmission, that is, no
actual interception and broadcast by another party is necessary for there to
be a “retransmission.” 161
A.

MHZ SO GOOD: TRADITIONAL WIRELESS LIKELY DOES NOT
QUALIFY FOR THE HOMESTYLE EXEMPTION

The oldest form of wireless speakers relies on standard radio waves to
transmit the signal from the base receiver to the wireless speakers. It is
comprised of a Radio Frequency (RF) transmitter unit and speakers
containing radio receivers to capture the signal. The transmitter can either
be integrated in the stereo receiver, or can be a separate attached unit, and
typically operates at a frequency near 900 MHz or 2.4 GHz, within one of
the ISM frequency bands reserved for industrial, scientific, medical, and
consumer use. 162 The signal “can be transmitted over a range of 150 to 300
160. In Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., the Supreme Court did not discuss or dispute
this holding by the Second Circuit. 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504–07 (2014).
161. See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text.
162. ISM band frequencies were set aside by the FCC to prevent industrial and
scientific instruments such as microwave ovens and RF heaters from interfering with
AM/FM radio and other FCC regulated frequency transmissions. These unregulated
bands are also used for consumer devices such as Wi-Fi LAN routers, cordless phones,
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feet and is not obstructed by walls, ceilings, or floors.” 163 It is an “open”
system: the radio signal is not exclusively sent to the speakers in the store
where the receiver is located. Use of these standard, non-dedicated radio
frequencies means that there can be interference and interception of the
signal reception from other wireless devices. 164 Any traditional wireless
speaker within range of the transmission can pick up the signal and play
the sound. There is a reason that modern cell phone signals are
encrypted—just ask Tom Cruise, whose conversations with his then-wife
Nicole Kidman were intercepted in the early days of cellphone
technology. 165
Not only is the signal quality poor and the sound quality equally so in
this first generation of wireless speaker technology, but it is also the system
least likely to comply with the Homestyle Exemption. Anyone with a
similar speaker in a location within range can intercept and hear the
retransmitted signal, such as the store next door’s owner. Courts can
interpret this kind of “retransmission to the public” to be one that requires
a license, as unauthorized use is a very real possibility with this system. It
is highly unlikely that a court would find this antiquated technology
compliant with the Homestyle Exemption.
B.

YOUR IPHONE’S BLUETOOTH CONNECTION

The second form of wireless speaker systems uses “Bluetooth”
technology. Bluetooth also transmits via an RF signal; 166 however, there
are important differences between the traditional system and a Bluetooth
system. One key distinction is that the Bluetooth transmitter and speakers
form a “closed network,” meaning there is a single “pairing” between the

and wireless speakers, so that consumers do not need to license frequency spectrum to
make a phone call. See FCC 47 C.F.R. 18 (2007); JOE DICHOSO, FCC CHIEF OF
EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION BRANCH, FCC BASICS OF UNLICENSED
TRANSMITTERS (2007), available at https://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/presentations/files/
oct07/Oct_07-Basics_of_Unlicensed_Trans-JD.pdf; see also Conversation with Mike
Bobelak, Heartland Field Sales Specialist, Polk Definitive Technology (May 8, 2014)
(notes on file with author).
163. Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014),
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers-/
10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
164. Id.
165. David Rosenzweig, Paparazzo Indicted in Interception of Cruise-Kidman
Telephone Call, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/11/
local/me-52989.
166. How Does Bluetooth Work?, SCIENTIFIC AM., http://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/experts-how-does-bluetooth-work (Nov. 5, 2007); Bluetooth, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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wireless transmitter and the speaker. The system’s user links the receiver’s
wireless transmitter signal to a specific speaker, and only those speakers
with this “permission” (i.e., those paired with the transmitter) can emit the
sounds sent from the system’s base. Usually, these systems have one
speaker containing a receiver (the “master”) and a second “slave” speaker
attached to the “master” via a wire. 167 The master speaker receives the
signal from the base, and the second speaker receives the sound signal
from the master speaker in the same manner a wired speaker does. 168
This is unlike the RF traditional wireless speaker system, because with
Bluetooth no speakers other than those “paired” with the transmitter are
able to receive the signal. 169 Because the user controls the system and the
pairing process, the signal cannot be used outside of the closed system.
Thus a store next door cannot use its own “unpaired” speakers to capture
the signal and then broadcast the signal in its store. Another distinction is
the range of a Bluetooth system. Bluetooth operates using shortwavelength, ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio waves that are much
shorter than the traditional RF wireless systems. 170 These hallmarks of
Bluetooth make it the wireless speaker system most likely to fall within the
Homestyle Exemption. A court analyzing this technology with regard to
the public performance right is unlikely to find that the broadcast is
capable of being “retransmitted to the public.” Bluetooth’s technological
limitations are likely its regulatory savior.
C.

THE UNCERTAIN OUTCOME FOR PLAY-FI

“Play-Fi” 171 is the industry term for using a wireless “intranet”
network—a dedicated local “Wi-Fi” wireless router in the home—for
transmitting and receiving the sound signal from the stereo receiver to the
wireless speakers, respectively. 172 The Play-Fi transmitter (attached to the

167. In a Bluetooth system, the transmitter sends a compressed data file, which is
translated into sound upon reaching the speaker. See How Does Bluetooth Work?,
SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-how
-does-bluetooth-work.
168. There are a few rare systems that operate using a matched pair of speakers,
whereby the signal is split between that pair. See Bobelak, supra note 162.
169. Id.
170. See Welcome to Bluetooth Technology 101, BLUETOOTH, http://www.bluetooth
.com/Pages/Fast-Facts.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
171. See Pendlebury, supra note 158.
172. Bobelak, supra note 162; see also Mike Giffin, DTS Play-Fi Wireless Audio
Explained, WREN SOUND, http://wrensound.com/dts-play-fi-wireless-audio-explained
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receiver base) first sends out a signal through the intranet network router
into the home’s Wi-Fi system to establish a “hand shake” between it and
the wireless speaker. 173 Once the connection has been established, the base
receiver’s transmitter sends a radio signal to the intranet Wi-Fi and
onward to any speakers connected to the network for translation into
sound. 174 This system has the advantage of mobility—users can control the
music station through a smart phone or other mobile computing device. If
the Wi-Fi network used is encrypted or password protected, then only
those who have access to the network will be able to broadcast the signal
on their compatible wireless speakers. If it is an “open” network—meaning
the network is not encrypted and no password is needed to access the
system and to pick up the transmission signal—then any compatible
speaker within range of the system’s router can translate and “perform” the
copyrighted work sent through the system. 175
The determination whether a Play-Fi system falls within the
exemption is not as straightforward as either the traditional RF or the
Bluetooth systems. The unencrypted signal more closely resembles the
traditional RF system, while the encrypted intranet look like a Bluetooth
receiving apparatus system. Thus, to have a chance of falling within the
Homestyle Exemption, a storeowner should use an encrypted signal.
D.

STREAMING MATTERS

Another challenge for courts interpreting § 110(5) is whether to
extend the statute to cover streaming broadcasts. As technology for
receiving radio broadcasts has evolved, so has the debate over copyright
infringement and exemptions. Suppose one of the businesses in our
Introduction chooses to “perform” music in its store via an Internet radio
or audiovisual streaming site. Because streaming audio is a “digital
broadcast” transmission, in addition to owners of the rights to musical
compositions under § 106(4), owners of the performance rights to sound

(last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“The Play-Fi protocol uses WiFi as its wireless
communication path.”). A common use of Play-Fi, streaming content from an online
music account, would not qualify for the Homestyle Exemption, which only applies to
broadcast radio stations. See infra, Section III.D.
173. Bobelak, supra note 162.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also DTS, INC., DTS PLAY-FI™: MULTIROOM WIRELESS STREAMING
ENABLES A NEW HOME AUDIO ECOSYSTEM 4–5 (2013), available at http://www.dts
.com/~/media/7cd1fbdd3663497f9608f7a220bcd1ae/9302K76100A_WP_DTS
_PlayFi.pdf.
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recordings would have § 106(6) 176 rights. 177 While the work is “intended
to be received by the general public,” or at least those who have an
Internet connection, it is less clear whether using an Internet radio station
as the source of the transmission would fall within the safe harbor of
§ 110(5). 178 “Live streaming” from a service such as Pandora (using either
a computer or another device as the “receiving apparatus”) requires
examination of how this technology fits under the law. 179 It is now
common to listen to music via a digital audio transmission through one’s
smartphone. Section 110(5) does not contemplate the use of digital audio
transmissions—even § 110(5)(B) limits its use to over-the-air radio and
television broadcasts, and cable/satellite non-broadcast transmissions. 180
Congress could not have imagined the existence of the streaming audio
and video either in 1976, when § 110(5)(A) was enacted, or in 1998 when
it added § 110(5)(B) via the Fairness in Music Licensing Act. 181 Section
110(5) merely states, “notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the
following are not infringements of copyright.” 182 This would thus appear
to include the public performance rights granted in both § 106(4) and
§ 106(6). This is another dimension to consider when determining if a
business owner needs a license to perform the streaming music signal in
her store, or whether the Homestyle Exemption covers digital public
performance rights.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.”).
177. See supra notes 164–171 and accompanying text. While § 110(5)(A) does not
specify that the communication of the performance by the public be via an over-the-air
radio or television broadcast, § 110(5)(B) does specify the types of public performance
transmissions that fall within its exemption.
178. § 110(5)(B).
179. Live Streaming is defined as “transmit[ing] or receive[ing] live video and audio
coverage of (an event) over the Internet.” Live Streaming Definition, OXFORD
DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/livestream (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
180. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2012) (limiting the Homestyle Exemption to
“communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a
performance . . . [of a] work intended to be received by the general public, originated by a
radio or television broadcast station . . . , or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable
system or satellite carrier”).
181. See Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
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Consequently, all three forms of wireless technology have significant
similarities and differences which affect the traditional analysis under the
Homestyle Exemption. While using a technology-blind approach as
prescribed in Aereo to determine whether streaming signals fall within this
safe harbor may or may not affect a court’s finding under § 110(5), it
would be the wrong way to analyze these systems.
IV.

TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS

A.

TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS AND AEREO

There is a larger issue at stake than whether wireless speaker systems
fall within the Homestyle Exemption, and whether courts should consider
the technology underlying these systems when making an assessment.
What is at stake here is whether courts generally should examine an
underlying technology when construing laws and making legal
assessments.
In order to make current copyright law applicable to technological
advancements, should courts summarily find that new technology falls
outside antiquated definitions, and thus beyond what is acceptable?
Should courts examine the technology at issue based on its purpose and
the congressional intent behind the relevant statute, or look for outward
similarities to technologies covered under the law, regardless of the
underlying mechanics? It is vital that we thoroughly consider the
implications of a judicial philosophy whereby courts ignore the underlying
mechanisms at play and instead focus strictly on how new technology
“looks” to the end user. That is to say, whether the underlying technology
involved in an infringement claim should be considered, or whether courts
should read the Copyright statute in a “technology-blind” manner is a
particularly important issue.
This Part discusses the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent
Aereo decision. It then illustrates how technology blindness would affect
the analysis of wireless technology under the Homestyle Exemption and
examines other unintended results of a technology-blind approach.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Aereo gives significant weight to
the concept of “technology blindness.” 183 And as alluded to in Justice
Scalia’s dissent, ignoring technology can have overreaching and

183. See generally Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
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unintended negative consequences that can ultimately stifle competition
and hinder innovation. 184
1. The Aereo Decision

Aereo was a company that developed an antenna system to meet the
needs of people who lived in locations where their home lacked the direct
line-of-sight vantage point to receive free, over-the-air television
broadcasts and who did not want to pay for a cable television
subscription. 185 Aereo’s system can be analogized to asking your next door
neighbor, who lives in a ten-story house—which affords her better
reception—if you can place a television antenna on her roof and run the
antenna cable from her home to your two-story home. 186 Your neighbor
agrees, but rather than stringing an ugly wire between your homes, she
suggests instead that you access your antenna through the Internet. Aereo
used an “economy of scale” 187 to provide this service to many people—it
184. See infra notes 257–264 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Jeremy Sheff, A Personal Take on Aereo, JEREMY SHEFF (June 26, 2014),
http://jeremysheff.com/2014/06/26/a-personal-take-on-aereo-with-some-philosophical
-ruminations (“[T]his system can be seen as analogous to a homeowner putting their TV
antenna on the roof of their house to get better reception. There’s a bit more to Aereo
than that, but truly, that’s all my family wanted: an antenna in a more suitable location
than our living room, with a wire connecting it to our TV.”); see also Tim Wu, The
Supreme Court Thinks You Are Better Off Paying $150/Month for Cable, NEW REPUBLIC
(June 25, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118390/supreme-court-aereodecision-wet-kiss-cable-tv (“Free, over-the-air TV is available to anyone willing to put up
an antenna. Aereo’s idea was to lease tiny antennas to its customers, and thereby make it
easier for people to grab the signals and bring them home. In fact, you could easily
duplicate Aereo’s service by putting an antenna on your roof; Aereo’s idea was just to
make that task more convenient, by acting as a virtual antenna installation man.”); Mark
P. McKenna, The Limits of the Supreme Court’s Technological Analogies: The Misguided
Aereo Decision Shows Why Technical Details Matter, SLATE (June 25, 2014)
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/abc_v_aereo_ruling_the
_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies.single.html. According to McKenna,
one might view Aereo as “simply supplying a more convenient and technologically
sophisticated substitute for putting an antenna on your roof . . . . It is therefore no
different than the delivery of content from the antenna on your roof to the television set
in your house.” Id.
186. This is known as “the longer cord argument—that there is no difference
between a consumer’s use of a rooftop antenna and her use of a remote antenna except
the length of the cable.” See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 23.
187. “Economies of scale” is a term used in microeconomics, whereby a business
obtains a cost advantage due to “a reduction in the cost of producing something brought
about especially by increased size of production facilities.” Economy of Scale, MERRIAM-
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was as if thousands of people ran virtual coaxial cables via the Internet
from their homes to Aereo’s facility, where their antennas were actually
located. In this manner, “Aereo’s system allow[ed] users to access free,
over-the-air broadcast television through antennas and hard disks located
at Aereo’s facilities.” 188
When developing their novel system for providing customers with the
ability to receive free, over-the-air broadcast transmissions, founders
Chaitanya Kanojia 189 and Barry Diller 190 relied on the Second Circuit’s
decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (aka Cablevision). 191
Based on the holding in Cablevision, they believed their system would not
infringe on the copyrights of the free, over-the-air programs viewed by its
subscribers. 192
Several portions of the court’s rationale in Cablevision were relevant to
Aereo’s antenna system design. First, as in Cablevision, individual Aereo
customers directed the recording and subsequent playback of content, 193
which constituted “volitional conduct.” 194 Second, like in Cablevision, each
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economy%20
of%20scale (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
188. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir.
2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
189. Chaitanya Kanojia Profile, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg
.com/Research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=640878&privcapId=138725
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2015).
190. Victor Luckerson, Aereo Backer Barry Diller: “It’s Over Now,” TIME (June 25,
2014), http://time.com/2921376/aereo-barry-diller.
191. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2008). See supra text accompanying notes 85–100.
192. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 7 (“Aereo built its system in reliance on
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause in Cartoon Networks v. CSC
Holdings.”).
193. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 133 (“[C]opies produced by the RS-DVR system
are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction
by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”); see also
Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 10 (noting that the Second Circuit in Cablevision
analogized to the VCR at issue in Sony, reasoning “that, in the case of a VCR it would be
‘the person who actually presses the button to make the recording . . . who supplies the
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains or, if distinct
from the operator, owns the machine.’” (quoting Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131)).
194. “[D]espite copyright infringement’s strict liability standard, ‘there should still be
some element of volition or causation . . . .’” Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 9
(quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1370 (N.D. Cal 1995)). The Netcom court found that the element of volition “is lacking
where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.” Netcom, 907
F. Supp. at 1370.
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potential audience for a transmission was a single subscriber, so this
transmission did not meet the definition of “transmit to the public” under
the 1976 Act. 195 Buoyed by the Cablevision decision, Aereo moved
forward with their business model, and in February of 2012, it began
selling subscriptions in New York City. Customers rented equipment
located in Aereo’s warehouse that gave subscribers access to those local
over-the-air broadcasts (for viewing via the Internet), which the
consumers had the right to view without paying subscription fees or
licenses to cable or satellite companies. 196
Aereo’s system thus provides the functionality of three devices: a
standard TV antenna, a DVR, and a Slingbox-like device. These
devices allow one to watch live television with the antenna; pause
and record live television and watch recorded programming
using the DVR; and use the Slingbox to watch both live and
recorded programs on internet-connected mobile devices. 197

Soon after Aereo’s system went live, local New York City broadcasters
filed complaints claiming copyright infringement and sought to enjoin
Aereo from operating. Initially, Aereo’s argument—that its system was not
infringing under the holding of Cablevision—was successful; the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, 198 and the Second Circuit 199
195. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135 (“[E]ach RS-DVR transmission is made using a
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one that can be decoded
exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any
given RS-DVR transmission.”).
196. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“Aereo argues that as in Cablevision it effectively rents to its users remote
equipment comparable to what these users could install at home.”), rev’d sub nom.
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). It is important to note that the
television broadcasts at issue were not those that are only transmitted via cable or satellite,
but rather solely for those over-the-air broadcasts from local television stations, such as
the local affiliates for ABC, CBS, NBC, Univision, and PBS as well as independent
local-only television stations. Aereo limited the stations one could receive based on the
zip code of the subscriber. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 680 (“Aereo is currently limited to
subscribers in New York City and offers only New York area channels.”).
197. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 682. The Slingbox, developed by Sling Media, transmits a
television signal (after it has been received in a home) over the Internet, so that a person
can watch programs available on her home television on her computer. See generally
Discovering Slingbox, SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/DiscoverSling.aspx (last
visited Mar. 20, 2015).
198. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
199. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 696.
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both ruled in its favor. In finding that Aereo did not infringe, the District
Court compared Aereo’s system of mini-antennas to the RS-DVR system
in Cablevision. 200 First, the court pointed out that “from the user’s
perspective, Aereo’s system is similar in operation to that of a digital video
recorder (DVR), particularly a remotely located DVR, although Aereo
users access their programming over the Internet rather than through a
cable connection.” 201 Second, like in Cablevision, there is no sharing of the
performances between users. 202 The District Court devoted a large portion
of its opinion to the technical function of Aereo’s system and how Aereo’s
operations comported with a finding that its system did not transmit “to
the public.” 203 Ultimately, the court held that because Aereo’s transmission
was not public, it did not infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights. 204
In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit also focused on how
Aereo’s system worked “behind the scenes.” 205 The appellate court noted
that the copies made for later viewing by Aereo’s system were not
infringing under Cablevision. 206 The court focused on two dispositive
200. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (“[T]he copies Aereo’s system creates are not
materially distinguishable from those in Cablevision, which found that the transmission
was made from those copies rather than from the incoming signal.”); see also id. at 386
(“As in Cablevision, the functionality of Aereo’s system from the user’s perspective
substantially mirrors that available using devices such as a DVR or Slingbox, which allow
users to access free, over-the-air broadcast television on mobile internet devices of their
choosing.”).
201. Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 378, 382–85 (“[J]ust as the antennas are not shared when they are in use,
the data obtained by a particular antenna while allocated to a particular user is not shared
with or accessible by any other Aereo user.” (internal quotations omitted)).
203. Id. at 377–81, 388.
204. Id. at 405.
205. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680–83 (2d Cir.
2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
206. Id. at 689–90. In applying the holding in Cablevision, the appellate court noted
that:
Cablevision’s transmissions of programs recorded with its RS-DVR
system were not public performances [based on] two essential facts:
First, the RS-DVR system created unique copies of every program a
Cablevision customer wished to record. Second, the RS-DVR’s
transmission of the recorded program to a particular customer was
generated from that unique copy; no other customer could view a
transmission created by that copy. Given these two features, the
potential audience of every RS-DVR transmission was only a single
Cablevision subscriber . . . And because the potential audience of the
transmission was only one Cablevision subscriber, the transmission was
not made “to the public.”
Id. (citations omitted).
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features from Cablevision: (1) the unique copies made by each subscriber
and (2) the limited potential audience of each transmission to an audience
of one. 207 As both features were present in the Aereo system, 208 the court
affirmed that Aereo’s transmissions were not public. 209
The Second Circuit recognized both the right of viewers to receive
over-the-air broadcasts and that Aereo merely facilitated this right for
those with a limited ability to install an adequate antenna:
It is beyond dispute that the transmission of a broadcast TV
program received by an individual’s rooftop antenna to the TV in
his living room is private, because only that individual can receive
the transmission from that antenna, ensuring that the potential
audience of that transmission is only one person. Plaintiffs have
presented no reason why the result should be any different when
that rooftop antenna is rented from Aereo and its signals
transmitted over the internet: it remains the case that only one
person can receive that antenna’s transmissions. 210

The appellate court also stressed that it was not uncommon for
entrepreneurs to develop innovative technology in order to avoid
infringing another’s copyright—often by relying on legal precedence for
direction. 211
Aereo’s luck ran out, however, when the Supreme Court took a
different view of its antenna array. The Supreme Court focused on how
Aereo’s antenna array appeared to function to the unassuming end user; in
doing so, it also choose a different end user perspective from the district
court, 212 which compared Aereo’s playback function to the home DVD
207. Id. at 693 (“Aereo’s system would not be creating public performances, since the
entire chain of transmission from the time a signal is first received by Aereo to the time it
generates an image the Aereo user sees has a potential audience of only one Aereo
customer.”).
208. Id. at 690 (“The same two features are present in Aereo’s system.”).
209. Id. at 691 (“[T]he relevant inquiry under the Transmit Clause is the potential
audience of a particular transmission, not the potential audience for the underlying work
or the particular performance of that work being transmitted.”).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 694 (“Aereo is not the first to design systems to avoid copyright
liability . . . . Nor is Aereo alone in designing its system around Cablevision, as many
cloud computing services, such as internet music lockers . . . appear to have done the
same.”).
212. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2508–09 (2014). On
November 21, 2014, Aereo filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection. Emily Steel,
Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014),
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player. 213 Writing for the 6–3 majority, Justice Breyer explained that when
viewed from the point of an end user, the defendant’s activities looked like
a cable system. 214
Justice Breyer implied that the Court’s characterization of the
technology as perceived by the consumer was what mattered, giving no
weight to other possible ways a consumer might view the technology, nor
how the underlying technology itself functioned. By doing so, he created a
quandary: how does a court determine which among several competing
technology-blind points of view is the “end user’s perspective” that it
should use? How does an innovator, worried that her new technology
might lead to an infringement suit, know which point of view a court
would choose?
Even though he chose a technology-blind approach, Breyer
acknowledged the differences between how Aereo and cable television
operated—specifically that each performance transmitted through Aereo’s
antenna array was only capable of being received by a single subscriber. 215
In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not
distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform
“publicly.” Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives,
why should any of these technological differences matter? They
concern the behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers
television programming to its viewers’ screens. They do not
render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of
cable companies. Nor do they significantly alter the viewing
experience of Aereo’s subscribers. Why should subscriber who
wishes to watch a television show care much whether images and
sounds are delivered to his screen via a large multisubscriber
antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they arrive
instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they are
transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? 216

Consequently, Breyer discounted the differences in the technological
architectures. While the Court acknowledged the differences between
Aereo’s and cable television operations, held that “[i]n terms of the Act’s
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html?smid=plshare.
213. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“[F]rom the user’s perspective, Aereo’s system is similar in operation to that of a
digital video recorder.”), rev’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676
(2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
214. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09.
215. Id. at 2508.
216. Id. at 2508–09.
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purposes, these differences [did] not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable
systems, which do perform ‘publicly.’” 217 This is reminiscent of the
rationale used in Jewell-Lasalle. 218 By ignoring a key “behind the scenes”
difference between Aereo’s system and cable television’s, Breyer was able
to claim that, if Aereo’s system did not infringe,
could not modern CATV systems simply continue the same
commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright
restrictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for
old? Congress would as much have intended to protect a
copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from
those cable companies. 219

On the surface it does appear that Aereo’s system would provide a
work-around for the traditional cable television stations (especially when
viewed through a “technology-blind” lens) however, the underlying
technological architecture can be distinguished in a significant way.
Aereo’s system is one where each user has her own antenna—a one-to-one
match—and is in control as to what is received by that antenna. 220 Cable
television, on the other hand—whether when it was in its infancy or in its
modern form—is a “one to many” system. 221 The cable television operator
receives the signals and then rebroadcasts them indiscriminately en-mass.
Subscribers receive all programs, and then choose which program to view.
Under this “one-to-many” system of secondary transmissions, CATV
operators are required to license the broadcast stations (via compulsory
licenses under Sections 111 and 119 of the Copyright Act). 222 In addition,
217. Id. at 2508.
218. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); see supra notes 24–29
and accompanying text.
219. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
220. See Eriq Gardner, Supreme Court Hands Broadcasters Huge Win in Aereo Battle,
HOLLYWOOD REP (June 25, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/aereoruling-supreme-court-hands-711333.
221. See A. Michael Noll, The Evolution of Media 4 (2007) (“Such communication
from one to many is called broadcast” (emphasis omitted)); see also Gordon Greb & Mike
Adams, Charles Herrold, Inventor of Radio Broadcasting 220 (2003) (discussing early
“broadcasting of entertainment and information, pre-announced, and directed toward a
known audience,” in comparison to the “radiotelephone”).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012) (titled “Statutory License for Secondary
Transmissions by Cable Systems”); see also Evolution of Cable Television, FCC.GOV,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated March 14,
2012) (“The Copyright Act requires cable operators to obtain a compulsory license for
the carriage of programming.”).
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the hundreds of channels transmitted solely by television networks are not
broadcast over-the-air and require separate, negotiated licenses—
essentially every channel except for the local broadcast stations, such as
New York affiliates of ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, as well as the local-only
broadcast stations such as WPIX fall under the latter. 223 Today, the typical
cable operator retransmits over 200 channels, almost all of which are
unavailable for reception through over-the-air broadcast antenna
capture. 224 As discussed infra, this technological difference should result in
a significant legal consequence.
The Supreme Court also justified its opinion by claiming that its
viewpoint was most in line with congressional intent underlying the
Transmit Clause. 225 The majority leapt to the conclusion that since
Congress sought to use the Transmit Clause to overturn two Court
decisions that found cable television transmissions were not public
performances, this also meant that Congress intended the clause to apply
to “an entity that acts like a CATV system . . . , even when it simply
enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals.” 226 Under
this brutally broad interpretation, all manufacturers and sellers of rooftop
antennas are also acting like cable television systems and are thus equally
performing and infringing because they, too, enhance a viewer’s ability to
receive broadcast television signals.
2. Is It Cable, or Is It Antenna?

By assuming that consumers viewing programming via Aereo would
think they were watching cable television, the Court took a technologyblind approach: without referencing any evidence in support of its
assumption, the Court made a factual conclusion that consumers watching
television via Aereo would naturally think that it was a cable television
transmission. 227
223. See, e.g., Peter Burrows, Lucas Shaw and Gerry Smith, Apple Said to Delay Live
TV Service to 2016 as Negotiations Stall, BLOOMBERG (AUG. 13, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-13/apple-said-to-delay-tv-service-to2016-as-negotiations-stall (discussing licensing negotiations between Apple and
numerous broadcasting companies).
224. See, e.g., Your Greenville, Laurens, Anderson & Spartanburg, SC Channel Lineup,
GOUPSTATE.COM, http://www.goupstate.com/assets/pdf/SJ17941825.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2014) (channel lineup for Charter Communications).
225. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
226. Id. at 2506.
227. This is disturbingly reminiscent of the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007), to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal law
which prohibited a medical procedure that anti-choice politicians labeled “partial birth
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This approach is muddled further by the possibility that more than one
technology-blind viewpoint could serve as the reference point for the
consumer’s perspective and illustrates a major flaw to this approach. Justice
Breyer could just have easily decided that, to the viewer, Aereo’s system
looked like a home antenna. Why—despite the obvious comparison to a
home antenna—wasn’t the home antenna the “technology blindness”
vantage point used by the Supreme Court? In fact, to the viewer, Aereo’s
antenna array more closely resembles home antenna reception than it does
cable television for several obvious reasons. First, cable television gives a
wide array of programming with hundreds of available channels, and nonbroadcast stations transmit programming that is only accessible via cable
or satellite television. 228 By contrast, a home antenna is limited to local
broadcast stations—usually between four and twelve total. 229 To a viewer
perusing the available channels via Aereo, they would appear no different
than those available through an antenna. Thus, any television viewer who
is limited to local broadcast stations—and understands that to receive
more stations, one needs a cable television subscription—is more likely to
believe that the channels received through Aereo to be via an antenna, not
abortions.” Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Kennedy declared he knew how women
must feel about terminating a pregnancy when he wrote that the choice of “[w]hether to
have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” Id. at 159
(emphasis added).
228. Glossary of Terms, NIELSEN MEDIA, http://www.nielsenmedia.com/glossary/
terms/C/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (defining a Cable TV System as “[a] non-broadcast
facility which distributes signals of one or more television stations and non-broadcast
services to subscribers”); Compulsory License, FCC Regulations and Retransmission
Consent—Rube Goldberg Would Be Proud!: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, IP and
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (testimony of Preston
Padden) (“[T]the programs on more than 500 non-broadcast channels—channels like
Discovery, History Channel, ESPN, and HBO—are NOT subject to compulsory
licensing, retransmission consent and associated FCC regulations. The programs on these
non-broadcast channels are distributed . . . through free market negotiations.” Mr.
Padden further testified: “When licensing programs for its channel, the non-broadcast
channel owner simply secures from the program owner he right to sublicense the program
to the cable and satellite distributors that carry the channel.”), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/09102013/Padden%20testimony%20091013.pdf.
229. Though an expensive home antenna located in a large metropolitan area, such as
Baltimore, Maryland, could receive up to forty local broadcasts from the nearby markets,
many would be redundant stations. See, e.g., Mike Snider, Cutting the Cord: Antennas Let
You Tune in TV for Free, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2014, 9:44 AM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/tech/personal/2014/04/19/cutting-the-cord-antennas/7870817.
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via cable TV. Second, cable television charges significantly higher fees
than Aereo did. Aereo’s pricing was a large selling point, 230 and the Court
is mistaken if it believes that consumers cannot recognize this difference.
Third, Aereo subscribers were fully aware how the system worked. This
information was readily available on Aereo’s website, and consumers could
consciously decide to purchase an Aereo subscription with this knowledge.
To view the consumer as oblivious to the underlying technology behind
Aereo insults the consumer’s intelligence.
By comparing the Aereo system to a rooftop antenna, even a
technology-blind Court would have a solid basis for its decision, based on
Congress’s very specific intent to give television viewers the right to receive
free, over-the-air television broadcasts. Title 47 of the Code of Federal
Regulations stipulates that licensed broadcast “stations must . . . transmit
at least one over-the-air video program signal at no direct charge,” 231 and
section 15 of that Title requires that all televisions imported into or sold in

230. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 185; Wu, supra note 185.
231. 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b) (2014). This requirement applies to both “Class A”
television stations and digital television (DTV) broadcast stations:
DTV “broadcast station permittees or licensees must transmit at least
one over-the-air video program signal at no direct charge to viewers on
the DTV channel. Until such time as a DTV station permittee or
licensee ceases analog transmissions and returns that spectrum to the
Commission, and except as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
at any time that a DTV broadcast station permittee or licensee
transmits a video program signal on its analog television channel, it
must also transmit at least one over-the-air video program signal on the
DTV channel. The DTV service that is provided pursuant to this
paragraph must be at least comparable in resolution to the analog
television station programming transmitted to viewers on the analog
channel.
47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b). Class A stations are low powered television stations (a.k.a. local
community access channels). Class A Television Service, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Class_A_television_service (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Marshall Brain, How
Digital Television Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks
.com/dtv3.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). In 2009, the United States completed the
transition from analog television to digital television to allow for other uses in the analog
TV radio spectrum, via section 3002(a)(1)(B) of the Digital Television Transition and
Public Safety Act of 2005. Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-171. Generally, digital television “is the transmission of audio and video
by digitally processed and multiplexed signal, in contrast to the totally analog and channel
separated signals used by analog television. Digital TV can support more than one
program in the same channel bandwidth.” Digital Television, WIKIPEDIA, http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_television (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Digital vs. Analog, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/opb/crashcourse/digital_v_analog/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).

1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF 06032015 (DO NOT DELETE)

1434

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

11/2/2015 9:35 PM

[Vol. 30:2

the United States be capable of receiving these stations. 232 In spite of the
Court holding in Aereo that viewers “perform,” 233 viewing programs on
one’s own private television does not infringe on the public performance
copyright right delineated in the Act. 234
It should be equally non-infringing for someone who—unable to
receive signals because it is impossible to string an antenna for reception of
locally available broadcast signals—chooses to rent a remote antenna
within her viewing area that is situated at a better vantage point. As long
as control of the antenna is by the customer, it is no different than the
customer accessing her rooftop antenna, and neither the antenna owner
nor its lessee would be infringing. Rather, both would be acting within the
confines and expectations of FCC regulations. Nothing in the law limits
what the viewer may use as a conduit to receive these stations.
Thus, the Court’s “looks like” test is problematic because there may be
several reasonable alternative technologies that could serve as a comparison
point. A trier of fact may have difficulty choosing which, among several
reasonable alternatives (some infringing, some not), the consumer thinks is
the source of the broadcast. The “looks like” method may lead jurists to
arrive at divergent findings of fact about future technologies; this will
cause further conflict and have an unsettling effect on innovation.
B.

TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS AND AIKEN

A technology blind approach would affect a court’s analysis of the
Homestyle Exemption. To a customer going from store to store in our
Introduction, there is no difference between the two methods of reception
(wired or wireless) with regard to the music she hears; she does not know
or care whether she is hearing music that emanated from an over-the-air
radio station, an Internet radio station, or from a simultaneous live-stream
of an over-the-air radio station over the Internet.
To store owners who want to use wireless speaker technology without
having to pay for a public performance license, the holding in Aereo seems
232. 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(b) (2013) (“TV broadcast receivers shall be capable of
adequately receiving all channels allocated by the Commission to the television broadcast
service.”).
233. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2500 (2014) (“[B]oth the
broadcaster and the viewer ‘perform,’ because they both show a television program’s
images and make audible the program’s sounds.” (emphasis in original)).
234. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“to perform the copyrighted work publicly”). Here,
the viewer’s “performance” is not “public.” See id.
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to provide a path out of the quandary of whether these systems could be
installed without being subject to the license requirement or facing
infringement actions. As discussed supra, 235 the Court in Aereo relied on
the concept of “resembling” a cable company’s transmission of a signal,
citing (1) Congress’ decision to legislatively overturn the Court’s
Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, 236 and (2) how, from the
consumer’s standpoint, Aereo’s system resembles that of a cable television
company, and thus was infringing on the plaintiffs’ copyright. 237
Analogizing this to the storefront using wireless speakers, from the
consumer’s vantage the broadcast she hears is no different than if it had
been performed via a wired speaker system. Both systems are commonly
used in homes, and as long as there was no modification of the wireless
system so that it more closely resembled a commercial one, then by
applying the technology-blind approach of Aereo, the Homestyle
Exemption would provide a safe harbor for the storeowner. Thus, if
wireless speakers are viewed as being the same as a wired system from the
point of view of the customer in the store (the audience), then by applying
“technology blindness,” a court would find that such a system resemble
wired speakers, and would thus be noninfringing. The behind-the-scenes
technology would not matter, wireless and wired speakers look the same to
the consumer, and therefore should be treated the same under the
Homestyle Exemption. Yet this is not how the courts have been instructed
to make the Homestyle Exemption determination. Rather, which
mechanism is used may play a dispositive role in determining the
outcome. 238 This Article’s discussion of the Homestyle Exemption
illustrates that Congress is very cognizant of the need for courts to
examine the underlying technology when determining infringement of the
public performance right.
To require that applications of the Transmit Clause be read in a
technology-blind manner, especially when read in conjunction with other
sections of the Act, can easily conflict with the language of those other
sections. 239 Further, there is no indication or guidance from Congress that
235. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
236. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Am. Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014) (“In 1976 Congress amended the
Copyright Act in large part to reject the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter.”).
237. Id. at 2508–09, 2511.
238. See supra Section II.E.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 124–138 and accompanying text.
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this should be the case. In many sections, such as the Homestyle
Exemption, the technological design of the sound system must be
considered in the factual determination of infringement. If we applied this
“how does it look to the consumer?” analysis to our storefronts, it would
conflict with the legislative intent as well as the language of § 110(5).
Thus, a technology-blind approach would ignore the plain language of
§ 110(5). As discussed supra, unlike the wired systems contemplated when
§ 110(5) was enacted, wireless speakers, by their very nature, require both
a transmitter that retransmits the radio signal, as well as a receiver in each
of the speakers, both of which on their face do not fall within the statutory
requirements for an exemption to the public performance right under
§ 110(5)(A). Rather than throw up our hands, despondent over this
predicament, courts can rely on congressional intent to construe the
existing law in such a way as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
Especially with regard to copyright law, the 1976 Act language, on its
face, illustrates that Congress did not want it to be confined to the
technology that existed when it was enacted, but rather wanted it to
accommodate future innovations that would be subject to the Act. As
previously discussed by this Author 240 and others, 241 Congress is aware
that when it is attempting to accommodate technological advancements
into copyright law, it is perpetually lagging behind the innovations. Slow
updates to § 110(5) are merely another example of this lag.
In addition, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would apply
“technology blindness” broadly to find a safe harbor from infringement via
the Homestyle Exemption, even though it has adopted the approach
240. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, Downstream Copyright Infringers, 60 KAN. L. REV. 1,
32 (2011) [hereinafter Liebesman, Downstream Copyright] (discussing generally a
legislative solution to innocent downstream infringing); Yvette Joy Liebesman, The
Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 156 (2010) [hereinafter Liebesman, Legislating] (“At various
times, Congress has chosen to wait and see if a scientific advancement adapts sufficiently
under current law, and in other instances has tried to anticipate how technology will
affect society.”).
241. See, e.g., Wilk, supra note 71, at 785 (discussing, in part, how the standard set
forth in Section 110(5) “is not stable, as advances in technology continually redefine the
parameters of the homestyle equipment standard”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) (exploring and critiquing
Congress’s method of creating of copyright legislation by negotiating with affected
private parties, industries, and others with vested interests, thus illustrating the historical
dilemmas that Congress has always faced in adapting copyright law to sometimes fastmoving technological advancements).
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elsewhere. As discussed supra, in Aereo the Court used “technology
blindness” to find a comparable apparatus based on what the viewer thinks
the technology resembles. Absent a licensing agreement or falling within
the exceptions of § 111, 242 performance by a system that resembled an
infringing technology would constitute infringement. Using this cognitive
framework, the small antenna system created by Aereo was transmitting
an unauthorized broadcast. 243 For the Homestyle Exemption, however, a
court would be comparing wired versus wireless speakers to find whether
the latter method of converting radio waves into audible sound waves is
similar enough to qualify as a safe harbor against the copyright owner’s
public performance or transmission rights. Additionally, courts could treat
the “looks like to the consumer” test differently for an infringement
determination than an exemption analysis. That is, adopting technology
blindness when determining infringement does not guarantee that a court
will construe exemptions in the same fashion. Indeed, to do so would be
contrary to the practice of construing rights broadly and exemptions
narrowly. 244
If rights and exemptions are both subject to “technology blindness,”
courts could find that a wireless speaker system “resembles” a wired system
without examining the differences in the technologies. Courts could thus
conclude that a safe harbor from infringement of the public performance
right exists, without even considering the commercial or home nature of
the system. Since the wireless system looks no different to the consumer in
any of the five stores in our Introduction, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Aereo and the Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision could be used to
expand the Homestyle Exemption to encompass wireless speaker
technology. But this would be reaching the correct conclusion using the
wrong analysis, and on a larger scale, is not the correct way to approach
these kinds of issues.
C.

TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS BEYOND AIKEN AND AEREO

The adoption of “technology blindness” has a strong chance of
inhibiting innovation and investment in new businesses and technologies,
all for the sake of preserving the current media content distributors’

242. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (providing exceptions that include secondary
transmissions within a hotel or where statutory licenses are paid).
243. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
244. See supra notes 104 and accompanying text.

1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF 06032015 (DO NOT DELETE)

1438

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

11/2/2015 9:35 PM

[Vol. 30:2

paradigm. 245 Yet just as the catastrophic prophecies of the movie industry’s
doom if Sony won back in 1984 246 did not come to pass, a holding in favor
of Aereo is unlikely to have led to the destruction of copyright owners’
rights, and instead could have led to further innovative methods of
disseminating media.
After Aereo, the Court has made it impossible for an innovator to
adequately determine how courts will interpret her new technological
advancement in an infringement action, if the technology itself is not a
determining factor. Technological work-arounds to avoid infringement are
hallmarks of innovation and industry growth. 247 Viewed either as merely
renting equipment, or as the volitional transmission by a single viewer (not
245. Professors Ginsburg and Giblin—in an article published prior to the Aereo
decision, asserted that “technology blindness” is the correct position for courts to take,
because otherwise it would wreak havoc on copyright owners’ rights. Giblin & Ginsburg,
supra note 89, at 19–22. The authors argue that “it is undesirable for legal outcomes to
depend so heavily on technical design” and seem to think that technology blindness can
be read into the copyright statute “without discouraging technological innovation.” Id. at
3. The professors are concerned that if Aereo had prevailed, cable companies would adapt
their technology and provide each person with their own individual transmissions to
avoid paying royalties under § 111. Id. at 19–21. This would cause havoc with the
economic remuneration for copyright owners. Id. (“[P]laintiff broadcasters have claimed
that Time Warner Cable has already ‘threatened to develop its own Aereo-like system to
avoid compensating copyright owners and broadcasters for the use of their
programming.’”). The professors claim that a decision in favor of the broadcasters will not
discourage innovation of technology that mimics the “longer cord” argument, and while
Aereo failed at this, others may be more successful. Id. at 23 (“Absent any way of making
a principled distinction between consumers transmitting performances to themselves
from their own antenna on their roof, and the antenna they rent in a remote array,
businesses may potentially be able to retransmit television signals without license even
without any time-shifted copies.”). “The key would simply be to ensure that their system
architecture mimics rooftop antennae sufficiently closely.” Id. at 23. Yet Aereo attempted
to closely model their system’s architecture to that of a rooftop antenna; the professors
claim that one which somehow modeled this even “closer” could be sufficient to pass
muster, but provide no guidance as to how—or even if—this could happen.
246. See Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
247. Cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The
limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement
of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be
dedicated ultimately to the public.”); cf. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright
Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR.
L. REV. 779, 786 (2005) (noting that a statutorily-created fair use exemption in patent
law would incentivize universities, research institutions, and companies “to investigate
existing technology so that they could truly innovate, including innovations aimed at
creating patentable improvements and noninfringing ‘work-around’ inventions”).
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to the public), Aereo was using an innovative method to comply with the
Transmit Clause as previously interpreted by the courts. 248 Accordingly,
the rationale behind the majority in Aereo—that is, its technology-blind
approach—is wrong and problematic.
V.

TECHNOLOGY MATTERS

A.

EXPANDING TECHNOLOGY IN TIME

Courts should continue to evaluate copyright litigation in light of the
technology at issue in the case. This Part first briefly discusses the
historical foundation of this argument, then discusses Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Aereo. It then posits future related discussions that are beyond
the scope of the Article.
Scrutinizing technology in copyright decisions is not new. Early
examples include Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony in 1884, where the
Court upheld the constitutionality of including photographs as
copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1831. 249 In
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., in 1908, the Court
examined the technology of player piano rolls to determine if it was subject
matter under the Act. 250 More recently, in 1995, the First Circuit used a
technology analogy in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,
Inc. 251 In that case, the court held that the menus at the top of the screen
of a computer spreadsheet program were a method of operation and
therefore not copyrightable subject matter under § 102 of the 1976 Act. 252
In dicta, the court compared this user interface to the Play and Stop

248. As Judge Chin noted in his Second Circuit dissent, Aereo’s
system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there
is no technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual
antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube
Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the
reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived
loophole in the law.
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). Yet
one person’s loophole and sham is another person’s work-around for the purpose of
complying with the law.
249. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
250. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
251. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
252. Id. at 816–17.
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buttons on a VCR, 253 noting that “[h]ighlighting the ‘Print’ command on
the screen, or typing the letter ‘P,’ [was] analogous to pressing a VCR
button labeled ‘Play.’” 254
Thus, from the expansion of technologies covered under the older
copyright acts 255 to the current phrasing of “now known or later
developed” in the present Act, Copyright Law is based in innovation.
Technology matters, and it is meant to be inclusive. It is the role of
Congress, not the courts, to decide where an innovation should be
excluded from rights and exemptions afforded under the Copyright Act.
The Second Circuit recognized in both Cablevision and Aereo that, when
applying the Transmit Clause, technical architecture matters. 256
B.

THE AEREO DISSENT

In his dissent in Aereo, Justice Scalia understood that interpreting
statutes without considering advances in technology will result in more
uncertainty, inhibit innovation, and deny innovators the freedom to look
for new ways to follow the law. To Scalia and his fellow dissenters, 257
technology does matter. His introduction succinctly states his problem
with the majority’s opinion:
Petitioners . . . broadcast copyrighted programs on the public
airwaves for all to see. Aereo . . . operates an automated system
that allows subscribers to receive, on Internet-connected devices,
programs that they select, including the Networks’ copyrighted
programs. The Networks sued Aereo [for violating] the
Networks’ “exclusive right” to “perform” their programs
“publicly.” That claim fails at the very outset because Aereo does
253. Id. at 817 (“In many ways, the Lotus menu command hierarchy is like . . . a
[VCR]. . . . Users operate VCRs by pressing a series of buttons that are typically labeled
[sic] ‘Record, Play, Reverse, Fast Forward, Pause, Stop/Eject.’” With a VCR, the way
“the buttons are arranged and labeled does not make them a ‘literary work,’ nor does it
make them an ‘expression’ of the abstract ‘method of operating’ a VCR via a set of labeled
buttons. Instead, the buttons are themselves the ‘method of operating’ the VCR.”).
254. Id. The First Circuit provided no guidance as to whether this is a situation
where the court examined the underlying technology or how it appears to the end user.
255. As noted in note 16 supra, the first Copyright Act of 1790 only covered books,
charts and maps. Over time, the list of fixed media was expanded to cover other forms of
technology, such as photographs, motion pictures, and sound recording.
256. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013),
rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
257. Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not “perform” at all. The Court manages to reach the opposite
conclusion only by disregarding widely accepted rules for serviceprovider liability and adopting in their place an improvised
standard (“looks-like-cable-TV”) that will sow confusion for
years to come. 258

Rather than relying on the amorphous and confusing “what does it
look like to the end user?” test to determine whether Aereo publicly
“performed,” both Justice Scalia and the Second Circuit differentiated
between direct and indirect infringement, and the long-held reliance on
the “volitional conduct” test for direct infringement as described in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.
(Netcom). 259 In Netcom, Judge Whyte of the Northern District of
California found that “despite copyright infringement’s strict liability
standard, ‘there should still be some element of volition or causation,
which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy
by a third party.’” 260 Thus, the person who owns the machine is not
necessarily the person who possesses it, uses it, or has access to it. 261
Absent some volitional conduct by an equipment owner like Aereo, courts
should not impose liability for direct infringement. 262
Justice Scalia also recognized that the majority’s opinion will result in
an inhibition of innovation: “It will take years, perhaps decades, to
determine which . . . systems now in existence are governed by the
traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo treatment
(and . . . systems now in contemplation will have to take their chances).” 263
The majority “provide[d] no criteria for determining when its cable-TVlook-alike rule applies,” 264 whether it should be considered specific to cable
television “look-alikes” or whether a broader “what does it look like to the
consumer” test governing any technology that is affected by the 1976 Act,
258. Id. at 2511–12.
259. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
260. Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 9–10 (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at
1370).
261. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121,
131 (2d Cir. 2008).
262. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between
direct and secondary liability would collapse if there were not a clear rule for determining
whether the defendant committed the infringing act. The volitional-conduct requirement
supplies that rule; its purpose is not to excuse defendants from accountability, but to
channel the claims against them into the correct analytical track.”).
263. Id. at 2517.
264. Id. at 2516.
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or if it is even broader than that, applying to any technology affecting any
law. What Justice Scalia seems to suggest is that (1) without certainty,
there will be less innovation and this is an anathema to the rule of law, and
(2) developing technology that purports to comply with the law should not
require prior congressional approval. Indeed, courts have long held that in
spite of what could be “harsh and unintended consequence[s], judges
should refrain from legislating from the bench.” 265 Scalia pointedly stated
that it was “not the role of this Court to identify and plug loopholes [in
the law]. It is the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit them, and
the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes.” 266 The innovators at
Aereo created a technology that, based on previous court decisions, they
believed worked around broadcasters’ public performance copyright right.
The fear expressed by scholars 267—that a decision favoring Aereo
would eviscerate the public performance right—ignores the fundamental
difference between Aereo and cable television. Any loss of control is
limited to programming over which the broadcasters already had limited
rights. Indeed, systems like Aereo’s actually would be a way to recapture
rights that Congress had deemed copyright owners did not own. Aereo’s
system only gave viewers access to those few over-the-air broadcast
stations that are freely available to all who can receive the signal through
the airwaves, and that television viewers are legally entitled to watch
without paying any additional fees. The majority of cable television
viewers receive hundreds of channels, and the vast majority are not
available for capture over-the-air. Cable television operators must

265. Liebesman, Downstream Copyright, supra note 240, at 25 (citing Exxon Mobile
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (“It is up to Congress rather
than the courts to fix” unintentional drafting gaps.); United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S.
123, 125 (1976) (per curiam) (“[I]t is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh
result. . . . [T]he court should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat.” (second alteration
in original) (quoting Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964) (per curiam),
superseded by statute, Tucker Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449,
as recognized in Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc))).
266. Id. at 2517–18 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new
technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our
job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”)).
267. See, e.g., Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89.
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negotiate licenses to receive and transmit those signals. 268 There is no
avoiding this, and workarounds such as Aereo’s would not provide a refuge
from infringement. As long as there are people who want to watch the
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament or Monday Night Football—both
only available through cable television 269 and with all of the retransmission
prohibitions firmly attached—non-broadcast television will continue to
thrive.
It is a bad precedent to outlaw third parties from facilitating the
exercise of rights which viewers legally possess via the relabeling of that
facilitating activity through judicial fiat. Based on this “looks like cable”
perception, the legality of any device that sends a signal from one’s home
antenna into one’s intranet may also be in jeopardy. For example,
Nuvyyo 270 and Simple.TV 271 sell equipment that sends television broadcast
signals received from a home antenna through the home’s Wi-Fi, which is
then watchable on a computer. Are these also rebroadcasts because the
program is viewed on one’s computer, rather than a standard television,
and thus “appear” to be like cable? Simple.TV has a subscription option
(like Aereo) for features beyond its basic system, such as pausing live TV
268. See, e.g., Alex Ben Block, Viacom Blackout Continues as Small Cable Company
Takes Stand in Retrans Fight, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/viacom-blackout-continues-as-small-693143.
269. CBS/Turner Sports has contracted for the rights to broadcast the early rounds of
the NCAA men’s basketball tournament through 2024, and Monday Night Football is
locked in with ESPN until 2021. See Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Reaches 14-Year Deal with
CBS/Turner for Men’s Basketball Tournament, Which Expands to 68 Teams For Now, USA
TODAY (Apr. 22, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/
2010/04/ncaa-reaches-14-year-deal-with-cbsturner/1#.ViJ-1fkzaUl; Richard Sandomir,
ESPN Extends Deal With N.F.L. for $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/sports/football/espn-extends-deal-with-nfl-for-15billion.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
270. Nuvyyo sells a device called Tablo, marketed as “a DVR for TV antennas that
targets this growing trend of mobile TV consumption and enables consumers to save
thousands of dollars by canceling expensive cable and satellite TV contracts and replacing
them with free Over-The-Air (OTA) HDTV.” NUVYYO, http://nuvyyo.com (last visited
Nov. 5, 2014). The Tablo box plugs into one’s TV antenna and uses the home’s Wi-Fi to
transmit the signal to mobile devices and laptops. Nuvyyo describes Tablo as “a nextgeneration DVR that plugs into an HDTV antenna to capture free, local HDTV
broadcast programs including news and sports within the US and Canada . . . . Tablo
connects to your home network using Wi-Fi or Ethernet to stream content to any
connected device inside your home or anywhere you have internet.” How Tablo Works,
TABLO TV, https://www.tablotv.com/how-tablo-works/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
271. Simple.TV describes itself as “a lovely little box that sits on your home network,
connects to an aerial antenna . . . and streams TV to your devices, plus records to storage
that you attach.” Welcome to Simple.TV, SIMPLE.TV, http://us.simple.tv/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2014).
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and accessing it outside your home network. 272 Because there is a
subscription fee, is this the tipping point for a court to find that this device
“resembles cable television”? Or is it merely the viewing of the program on
one’s computer rather than a standard television? Where is the line to be
drawn?
Perhaps instead the problem the Court sees with Aereo is one of
commercialization. That is, receiving the free, over-the-air broadcast
signal is fine, as long as no one other than the copyright owner has the
ability to commercialize reception of the signal, even indirectly. There is
no way of knowing—the Court’s majority gave no guidance in its holding,
leaving lower courts to navigate the quagmire.
With such uncertainty, inventors and entrepreneurs would risk
infringement lawsuits and bankruptcy if they moved forward with an
innovation that they otherwise believe to be noninfringing because their
device or system “looked like” an infringing one from one possible—no
matter how improbable—viewpoint of a technology-naïve audience. The
risk would be too great, and innovative ideas would likely be inhibited
from being actualized, for fear that the Court would hold that it did not
approve of the new technology. This resulting inhibition is contrary to the
ultimate goals of the Copyright Clause. 273
C.

FUTURE DISCUSSIONS

This Article illustrates just some examples of the problems associated
with ignoring technology with regard to copyright litigation. In spite of
the Aereo decision, courts—based on their ability to distinguish Aereo from
the facts before them—will hold conflicting views on technology
blindness. 274 Their disparate findings and their implications are worth
272. Kate Cox, You Can Make Your Own Aereo At Home, But Is It Worth It?,
CONSUMERIST (May 31, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/05/31/you-can-makeyour-own-aereo-at-home-but-is-it-worth-it/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
273. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
274. See, e.g., CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 7532 NRB, 2014
WL 3702568 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (holding that FilmOn’s mini-antenna, Internet
viewing broadcast television system was similar to Aereo’s, based on the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the latter that it was “like cable”); see also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the underlying
technology at issue is significant in determining whether it has substantial non-infringing
uses).
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further analysis; this and other issues raised extend beyond what may be
discussed in a single article.
The formation of a unifying theory regarding the treatment of
technology in copyright is a larger issue which is ripe for development.
When courts should or should not consider technology in their
deliberations extends beyond the Transmit Clause and the Homestyle
Exemption. The question especially extends to matters where Congress is
silent—though it also apparently arises even where Congress has spoken.
Clauses that are silent on the subject are often read in conjunction with
those that speak to it. For example, the Transmit Clause contains no
technology-specific language, but it is often paired with sections that do.
Further discussion is warranted regarding how judicial interpretation of
the above discussed issues via objective principles of construction would
influence their validity. Doctrines of statutory construction—touched on
briefly in Part II—would influence a finder of fact who is deliberating an
infringement claim, or the applicability of a safe harbor.
Furthermore, is a court truly being “technology blind” when it merely
compares one form of technology another? As with Aereo, the court takes a
superficial look at technology in its “looks like cable” attitude, but then
states that it should not consider the underlying technology that is at the
heart of the definitions of Transmit and Secondary Transmissions. Should
it be an “all or nothing” proposition? While holding that Aereo was “like”
a cable company for the purposes of the Transmit Clause, the majority
also intimated that Aereo was not like a cable company with regard to
§ 111, and thus could not procure compulsory licenses under that section
of the Copyright Act. 275 How do such holdings comport with the
legislative intent—as well as the language—of the applicable sections?
Finally, further dialogue is warranted as to how technology blindness
would hinder innovation beyond copyright law; investment in new
technologies, venture capital, start-up and entrepreneurial risks, as well as
patenting implications all need to be examined.

275. On remand before the district court Aereo pursued, and was denied, a theory of
being treated as a cable company entitled to a compulsory license under § 111. Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12-CV-1540, 2014 WL 5393867, at *2–6 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2014) (noting that “not all entities that perform publicly in ways similar to cable
systems are entitled to the § 111 license”).
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FINAL THOUGHTS

In the years immediately following the enactment of the Homestyle
Exemptions, scholars examined and prodded the statute, studying its flaws
and whether it actually solved the problem it attempted to address—that
is, providing small businesses an exemption to the public performance
right of § 106(4). 276 Congress was clear that copyright protection is not a
rent-seeking vehicle, and that certain uses of another’s copyrighted
material would not require permission. It viewed the mere playing of a
radio in a storefront as one of those exceptions. Yet the technological
limits in § 110(5) were based on what was commonly found in homes in
1976. 277 Were it a static statute, storefronts would be limited to the
devices found in homes in 1976. Congress, however, made it clear that
this was not the case, and new technologies in question must be examined
based on contemporary findings of what is commonly found in homes.
Legislators were clear that the underlying, “behind the scenes” technology
did matter. Other sections of the 1976 Act also contemplate the actual
technology in use, 278 as do related statutes, such as the FCC sections
discussed herein. Thus, courts have long been directed to interpret various
sections of the 1976 Act based on new technology not yet envisioned
when the law was enacted. The finder of fact has at his or her disposal the
ability to examine the facts and the technology, and to reach a conclusion
based on how the actual technology fits within the law.
It is tempting to ignore technology that one does not understand.
Sometimes it will not matter, and a court could achieve the same result
276. See generally Shipley, supra note 127; Wilk, supra note 71; James B. MacDonald
II, Defining the Limits of the Home-Type Receiver Exemption in 17 U.S.C. § 110(5): Cass
County Music Co. v. Muedini, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147 (1997); Makeen, supra
note 83.
277. The 1995 Act implementing § 110(5)(B) recognized technological
advancements that happened between 1976 and 1995. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.
278. The Copyright Act is full of examples where Congress uses technology-specific
language, such as the Audio Home Recording Rights Act of 1992 and the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recording Act. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237; Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. The latter provides great detail and technical
specifications regarding licensing for digital broadcasts and limitations on the right.
While there are some technology-neutral sections, these cannot be considered in a
vacuum. Rather the language at issue should be addressed as a whole, including any
incorporated technology-neutral sections, and should give relevance to the technologyspecific language.
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either way. While there may be situations where ignoring technology
provides a safe harbor for a would-be infringer—such as illustrated in this
Article with wireless speaker technology—it will more likely lead to a
stifling of innovation. As illustrated, courts have other avenues for
conferring wireless speakers a safe harbor under the Homestyle Exemption
without resorting to hand waving and declaring themselves technologically
unsavvy. Deliberations do not require the use of a Sesame Streetresembling “one of these things is not like the others” exercise as to
whether a new technology resembles others already in existence. 279
This Article is not merely another example of the interaction between
law and technology. Nor is it an additional illustration of how the law’s
failure to keep up with innovation might lead to unintended and undesired
adverse consequences that were not contemplated when the Copyright Act
was debated. Rather, as emphasized supra, 280 there is a larger issue at
stake—that the Court is setting a dangerous precedent for technology
blindness when, against all evidence to the contrary, it held that
underlying technology does not matter when construing infringement
under the Transmit Clause in the Copyright Act of 1976. There are
serious flaws and ramifications if courts instead feign technology ignorance
and blind themselves to how innovations actually work when making these
crucial holdings. To which technology do we compare it? As with Aereo,
when examining an innovation that seeks to comply in a new way with an
existing law, there may be more than one from which to choose. The
Court’s majority decision could lead to a change in the current paradigm
of allowing innovation to flourish and then legislating when an invention
adversely affects public policy, 281 instead playing into the hands of those
seeking to protect their market from new players. Innovators would need
to first have their inventions cleared as being “noninfringing” by Congress
before moving forward. 282 This is contrary to Court precedent, and
Congress has repeatedly shown itself capable of legislating for specific
technology that it deems falls outside the bounds of the public policies it
279. A well-known segment of Sesame Street is titled: “One of these things is not
like the others.” See, e.g., Sesame Street, Sesame Street: One of These Things, YOUTUBE
(July 16, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6b0ftfKFEJg.
280. See supra Part IV.
281. See generally Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240.
282. See, e.g., Brief for Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of the United
States, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.,
712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2012) (Nos. 12-2786-cv, 12-2807-cv) (arguing that
“[c]ommercial exploiters of new technologies should be required to convince Congress to
sanction a new delivery system and/or exempt it from copyright liability”).
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wishes to promote. 283 This philosophy of “seeking permission first” has
been long desired by rights holders who “claim that the sky is falling
whenever a new technology threatens an existing business model.” 284 Such
a policy would give undue influence to those who are already “players”
attempting to protect their market share in an anticompetitive manner,
thwart new entrants to the marketplace, and stifle innovation. But such
fears are rarely brought to fruition. As stated by Professor Mark Lemley,
“if you claim that the sky is falling whenever a new technology threatens
an existing business model, the rest of the world can be forgiven for not
believing you when you claim that this time around it’s going to be
different.” 285 While new technology usually alters an industry’s business
model, causing certain revenue streams to decline, it also opens up new
opportunities. 286
Justice Scalia notes in his Aereo dissent that the Court should wait for
Congress to act, and not on its own create new law to encompass the new
innovations the way it thinks the law should go. 287 New technologies
should not have the burden of proving their right to exist, yet this is
exactly what this decision threatens to implement. 288 This Author also has
283. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 500 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, there can be no really satisfactory solution to the
problem presented here, until Congress acts . . . .” Justice Blackmun contended that “[w]e
must ‘take the Copyright Act . . . as we find it,’ and ‘do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles . . . until the Congress legislates.’”). See generally
Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240, at 179 (“[L]egislation has attempted to fill in the
gaps in copyright protection when, after the technology had reached an advanced level of
development and public use, it concluded that further protection was needed.”).
284. Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 125, 132 (2011).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2518 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he proper course is not to bend and twist the Act’s terms in an effort to
produce a just outcome, but to apply the law as it stands and leave it to Congress the task
of deciding whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.” Justice Scalia went on to
conclude, “as the Court concluded in Sony: It may well be that Congress will take a fresh
look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past.
But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”).
288. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 284, at 133 (“[I]nnovation regimes in which no one
can develop a new technology unless they get the collective permission of all the content
owners whose content might be distributed with that technology are not going to
work.”); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 129 (2003) (“Even before the free flow of content in the Napster and post-
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previously argued that Congress usually waits for technology to develop,
then steps in if the technology operates against the policies that Congress
wishes to support. 289 If congressional intent is unclear, it is not up to the
Court to play clairvoyant. Rather, Congress should step up and clarify the
breadth of copyright owners rights encompassed as questions arise
concerning new technology which cannot be reconciled under the current
Act.
The Homestyle Exemption is just one example of how certain public
performances are not within copyright owners’ bundle of rights. Business
owners who play radio and television programs for their customers’
enjoyment are shielded from rent-seeking by content owners and
providers. And in determining whether the exemption applies, the
technology in use is glaringly key. This should be no less true for other
exemptions, such as the right to receive free, over-the-air broadcast
television performances in one’s home.
Knowing the bounds of our rights through court decisions is not
restricted to intellectual property. We abhor laws that are vague and fail to
state boundaries that we cannot cross. If the courts are free to move these
boundaries based on their own concept of what a technology “looks like,”
they are rejecting one of the central foundations of our legal system—
confidence and certainty in the rule of law. 290

Napster era, the content industries actively resisted the introduction of digital
technologies and used the threat of such technologies as a basis for obtaining new
legislation expanding rights and enforcement powers of copyright owners.”).
289. See Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240, at 177.
290. See, e.g., Liebesman, Downstream Copyright, supra note 240, at 29–30.

